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INTRODUCTION
In the following chapters we will carry out an
inspection of how the internal political configurations,
institutions, routines, and domestic developments affected
the conduct of foreign policy in the Soviet Union and the
United States between 1945 and 1948. By unfolding the
circumstances around the eruption of the Cold War, we might
gam a valuable insight into the interrelatedness of
internal political conditions and foreign policy.
The twentieth century has been the century of wars.
Half of its so far elapsed ninety- four years witnessed
global conflicts which were called "war". Since Walter
Lippmann's landmark 1947 book we have known that wars can
differ not only in intensity and dimension, but also in
temperature, and it was this "Cold War" that dominated world
politics between the mid- forties and the late eighties.
Opinions diverge concerning the starting point of the
Cold War. According to some assessments, the Cold War
started in 1917 when the Bolshevik Coup established a regime
openly hostile to the Western capitalist democracies and, in
return, the Western states launched an abortive and
disorganized intervention to dispose of the Red Menace.
Others believe that World War II turned into Cold War
following V-E Day, originating from the Soviets' violation
of the Yalta Agreements. More widely accepted views attach
1
to events like
the New Year's Day of the Cold War calendar
Stalin's February, 1946 preelection speech, Churchill's
Fulton speech, the announcement of the Greek-Turkish Aid
(Truman Doctrine)
,
the Soviet pullout from the Paris
negotiations of the European Recovery Program (Marshall
Plan)
,
the Berlin Blockade, the Vandenberg resolution, or
the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, depending on which
issues the student considers to be the major cause.
Those who believe that the main source of the Soviet-
American conflicts was the deep-seated differences in the
philosophical, ideological, historical, and moral heritage
of the two societies, that is intrinsic factors, tend to
trace the beginning back to 1917. If one finds the causes in
external events as in the changes in the European balance-
of -power and in the Soviet conduct following World War II,
the starting point is likely to be identified with one of
the above mentioned series of post-war events 1
.
Naturally, one is not bound in evaluating the Cold War
era to adhere to a single set of causes, or search by any
means a fixed date for its eruption. The Cold War was the
result of complex historical, political, philosophical, and
psychological developments that embrace not decades, but
several centuries. Traditions of the Western societies go
back as far as the ancient Greeks and Romans, incorporating
the results of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as
1 Graebner (1962), p. 218.
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well as those of nineteenth century liberal political
thought. As opposed to this, the philosophical creed of
Communism is of more recent origin and evolved purposefully
as a sharp departure from the course of Western development
and as a response to the ugly inequalities having originated
from the industrial revolution. Furthermore, while Western
states were the cradles of civil liberties and liberal
ical institutions, and many of them have exercised
democracy since the American War of Independence and the
French Revolution, Russia shifted from one of the most
repressive authoritarian regimes to the most ruthless
totalitarian regime in history. As a result of these
historical determinants, the political institutions and the
entire policy making process followed a different pattern in
the Soviet Union and in the most prominent representative of
the Western democracies, the United States 2
.
Nonetheless, this thesis concentrates on the intrinsic
causes of the Cold War. As a part of our main line of
argument we will claim that there was not a significant
possibility of altering or influencing the policies of the
Soviet Union, because of the secretiveness of the system,
and because particular actions were often not taken as a
response to certain Western steps, but as a part of a
strategy that was determined by primarily domestic factors.
We will elaborate on the nature of the factional debates
2 Bialer and Mandelbaum, chp. 2; Ryavec, pp. 11-16.
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within and around the Politburo, and attempt to discover the
connections between these struggles and the foreign policy
outcomes. We will show that the basic assumptions of
American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union evolved
during 1945-1946, were converted into concrete policies
during 1947-48 through compromises and cooperation between
the President and the Congress, and were affected by the
proposals and activities of Henry Wallace, Truman's primary
adversary on issues concerning the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, an inspection of personal political
predilections and beliefs of individual leaders on both
sides will be carried out along the lines of the previous
chapter
.
The thesis is divided into three main sections. In the
first part we will provide a theoretical discussion on the
question of how internal factors affect foreign policy by an
analysis of the existing literature and by developing a new
approach on the basis of our findings. In the second part we
will turn to our case studies. The discussion of the
relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in
the Soviet Union starts with the presentation of the general
characteristics of postwar Soviet politics under Stalin.
This is necessary because understanding the Soviet policy-
making process and the motives of decisions is impossible
without pointing out how sharply they differed from the
Western models. After getting acquainted with the main
4
characters of the events, we will investigate the central
issues of domestic politics during our period that affected
the attitudes of the leading politicians towards foreign
policy. Subsequently, we will turn to the area of foreign
policy, and show how it was influenced by the main
characters of the competing factions and Stalin, and attempt
to explain the reasons of the shift in foreign policy that
took place during 1947.
Since the American political system lies within our
traditional understanding of politics, we will not elaborate
on its operation in this paper. Following an overview of the
immediate postwar American politics, first we will discuss
how the Truman Administration during 1945-1946 came to
revise the basic attitude of President Roosevelt toward the
Soviet Union, then we will show how the entire course of
American foreign policy was altered by 1949 as a result of
the interactions among the President, the Congress, and
Henry Wallace, Presidential Candidate and challenger to
Truman's foreign policy throughout 1947-1948.
In the third section we will provide an assessment of
Soviet and American foreign policy in terms of their being
constrained by domestic factors and we will relate the
empirical findings to the theoretical assertions laid down
in the first chapter. The thesis will be completed by a
brief conclusion.
5
CHAPTER 1
INTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
International relations deals with the interaction of
nations. Since 1648, it has been the state, as the prime
embodiment of a nation's sovereignty, that most frequently
has communicated will and intentions between nations.
Generally, governments or regimes representing states
articulate and coordinate their attitudes and strategies in
relation to other states in the form of a comprehensive
foreign policy. Although foreign policy, like any
communicative action, is in large part constituted of
responses to incoming stimuli, that is other states'
behavior, significant events, general external developments,
these are not the sole determinants - an equally important
component comes from inside the state. This thesis explores
the internal factors that influence a nation's foreign
policy
.
As has been noted, foreign policy is drawn up by the
regime that controls the state. According to Salmore and
Salmore, a "regime is defined as the role or set of roles in
a national political system in which inheres the power to
make authoritative policy decisions" 3
. The desired goal of a
regime is to obtain and retain power, and it acts rationally
in the respect that it attempts to use its resources
3 Salmore and Salmore, p. 103.
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efficiently in order to achieve these ends. The term
rational here should not suggest, in opposition to the
argument of many realist analysts, that all decision makers
operate with the same approach and act in the same way under
the same circumstances. "Decision makers vary significantly
in choice propensities, beliefs, and personality traits.
These characteristics structure the decision-makers' range
of goals and shape the analysis of alternatives by the
decision maker. Insofar as possible, a policy-maker's
choices are selected which are consistent with these
principles and constitute the boundaries of rational
behavior for the decision-maker" 4
.
These points indicate the need to follow a two- fold
technique in our investigations. On the one hand, foreign
policy is influenced and constrained by resources available
for the regime to realize its conceptions. As we will argue,
resources are determined mostly by non-personal or
structural components originating outside the personality of
the individual leaders. These include in addition to the
geographical conditions and economic capabilities of the
country, the type of the regime, prevalent methods for
arranging political affairs, internal cohesion of the
governing group, or the relationship of the leaders and the
led towards each other.
4 Walker, pp. 404-405.
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On the other hand, we need to take into consideration
the idiosyncratic features of those who conceive of and
implement foreign policy. The factors belonging into this
area arise from inside the individuals, they vary from
person to person, and affect behavior differently. When
discussing these issues we utilize the findings of cognitive
psychology, belief system, and operational code theories.
By carrying out these examinations we aim to set up an
explanatory model for foreign policy formation. We will step
beyond the die-hard rational actor model and give a weighed
credit to idiosyncratic influences. As our title shows, we
did not select the accepted term "domestic", since it
downplays several aspects this paper emphasizes. However,
our imposing limits on rationality does not mean that we
intend to erase that notion from our vocabulary.
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the isolationist - turned-
internationalist said in the 1940s that "politics stops at
the water's edge". Being a leading Republican politician
(potential presidential candidate in 1944)
,
and the number
one authority in the GOP in the foreign policy area, his
pronouncements were influential. Indeed, this sentence soon
became the basis of the bipartisan American foreign policy
(apart from occasional discords as the debate over China)
,
and remained so until the controversies of the Vietnam War.
Vandenberg' s goal was to make foreign policy immune from the
8
fluctuations and partisan fightings of domestic politics.
This was especially necessary after the 1946 elections when
the Republican party for a short period regained the
majority in the Congress, and in the context of the shock
caused by the breakup of the Grand Coalition the new
superpower could not afford an inconsistent and defensive
foreign behavior.
However, these remarks beg the question: is it possible
to completely bifurcate foreign and domestic politics? Can
we make foreign policy immune from internal influences? We
will not spend much time for proving our answer, which is
clearly "no"; the entire argument in the following pages
will make it apparent.
As a first step, we need to articulate the basic
assumptions that will assist us in our further
investigations. According to the mainstream realist
approach, the ultimate aim of states is to preserve their
sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are three
factors that determine a state's behavior vis-a-vis other
states: the degree of functional differentiation among
states, the character of the international system, and the
distribution of capabilities. Since, as Waltz argues, there
is no functional differentiation among states, and the
international system is anarchic, lacking a central
legitimate authority, and is unlikely to develop a
hierarchic order, the sole factor that affects a state's
9
international behavior is its relative capabilities. Further
developing this argument realists claim that similarly
situated states behave similarly, regardless of their
different domestic structures.
In opposition to this approach we argue that there is a
close relationship between a state's internal
characteristics and its international behavior. Both are
mutually inseparable: it is not possible for a leadership to
pursue a foreign policy by completely ignoring the domestic
context of the actions, and vice versa, any measures in the
domestic political field must be contemplated, designed, and
implemented by taking into consideration their international
repercussions
.
A logical continuation of this point is that different
domestic structures affect foreign policy differently. If
the domestic context is favorable, the leaders will be faced
with an easier task when conducting the state's foreign
policy. Similarly, inconvenient internal circumstances pose
greater difficulties for the decision makers. In order to
understand the exact nature of this relationship, we need to
examine the different types of domestic structures that
occur in the international arena, and explore what sort of
influence they exert on the state's foreign behavior.
As it has been pointed out above, a regime's primary
goal is to maximize its political support and, ultimately,
its power. Consequently, their political, including
10
diplomatic strategies are constrained by their need to
remain in office. Leaders opt for war, negotiations,
sanctions, economic measures, not so much according to the
intrinsic value of each of these actions, but chiefly in
terms of their likely impacts on the government's political
fortunes
.
A large number of scholars have concerned themselves
with the study of the different ways regimes constrain
foreign policy. These approaches can be arranged into two
groups
. The underlying idea in the studies belonging to the
first group centers around the notion of accountability. As
they argue, closed societies, where there is a low degree of
accountability, are not, or are only to a very low degree
constrained by domestic political influences, whereas in
open regimes this influence is strong. The second group, in
contrast, acknowledges the possibility of the phenomenon
rejected by the former group.
One of the earliest works that aimed to inspect the
issue belongs to R. Barry Farrell. He contended that
political conditions in open and closed systems are
fundamentally different. Open polities have much opposition,
because they have "competitive, regular electoral contests,
legalized two- or multi-party organizations aimed at
offering alternative governmental leadership, a high degree
of toleration for autonomous groups in politics, and an
acceptance of constitutional restraints on governmental
11
power". As opposed to this, closed systems are largely
immune from visible domestic constraints. The characteristic
features of the "totalitarian" regimes include "an official
ideology, a single mass party, a system of terroristic
policy control, near complete party control of all means of
mass communication, and central control of the entire
economy" 5
.
In a later, and more sophisticated project called CREON
(Comparative Research on the Events of Nations)
,
Salmore and
Salmore went further, but fundamentally remained within the
confines of the previous studies. They developed a three-
fold system of criteria that describe the manner regimes
constrain foreign policy formation. The important factors
are the following: (l) the amount of political resources at
the regime's disposal, (2) political constraints, (3) the
regime's disposition to use the resources at its disposal.
The availability of resources varies according to the scope
of societal activity under the control of the regime, to the
degree of political institutionalization, and public
support . Regimes with wide governmental scope and an
efficacious and complex bureaucracy will face fewer
dificulties during foreign policy formation and
implementation. Political constraints include the degree of
coherence within the regime, accountability, and the extent
the leadership represents the society. Diverse societal
5 Farrell, pp. 167-208.
12
interests and rules of attaining and retaining political
office also contribute to the relationship. According to
Salmore and Salmore, military governments and one party
systems are less constrained, since they are generally
immune from doctrinal or ideological differences. The third
factor depends on two aspects: on the extent to which
regimes are willing to change the rules of the political
game in order to achieve power and implement policy, and on
their commitment to expand either the resource base of the
society or its control over it. Governments that are
maximalist or expansionist will be less constrained than
minimalist or status quo leaderships 6
.
Wilkenfeld in his IBA (Interstate Behavior Model) model
approaches the question from a slightly different
perspective. As he points out, it is the "formal
institutional factors", such as legislatures and
bureaucracies, "linkage mechanisms", for instance public
opinion, and "political system aggregate descriptor
variables", referring to the overall features of the
political system, we need to direct our attention to. At a
later stage when discussing political conflicts he finds
that "within certain groups of nations
. . . there tends to be
a relationship between internal (domestic) conflict behavior
and external (foreign) conflict behavior", and there is a
tendency for internal and external conflict behavior to
6 Salmore and Salmore, pp. 103-122.
13
occur simultaneously, or for one of them to be followed in
time by the other. He argues that in relatively open types
of regimes (personalist
,
polyarchic) there are cases when a
pattern of mutual reinforcement appears in which a certain
pair of internal and external conflict measures occur in
succession. In these states neither external, nor internal
measures can be taken in isolation of each other. However,
in centrist states the primary characteristic of which is
centralized control of most aspects of life, the leadership
does not have to concern itself with the internal
repercussions of external events 7
.
All these models place disproportionately great weight
on the concept of accountability. They claim that the
primary, and often sole source of constraint originates from
the existence of legitimate opposition and certain
constitutional procedures. Furthermore, they downplay the
possibilities of political divisions in closed societies. In
fact, due to the diffusion of power across institutional and
bureaucratic groups there exist political constraints in
totalitarian or centrist regimes. In such structures
leadership is often collective, and power must be shared
with other groups of authority. Conflict within the regime
can be intense, and foreign policy decision making highly
politicized because of the presence of competing belief
7 Wilkenfeld, pp. 107-123.
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systems and institutional interests, and as a result of the
continuous struggle for power and position among high ranked
officials
.
An alternative approach toward the issue would
concentrate on regime level factors that place constraints
on foreign policy. Two such components might be regime
fragmentation and vulnerability. The former of these
concepts concerns the degree to which a government's
central political leadership is fragmented by persisting,
internal political divisions in the form of competing
personalities, institutions/bureaucracies, factions, or
competing parties or other such groups". Ultimately, it
involves a single leader's ability to dominate the political
environment 8
. Furthermore, it is necessary to take into
consideration not only the decision making unit's direct
impact on the policy outcome, but also the extent to which
additional factors within the unit exert influence on the
decision making process.
If the regime is pervasively controlled by a
predominant leader, we need to know about his political
style. If he is insensitive, knowledge about his personality
might offer sufficient clues to understand the process. But
if he is sensitive to external stimuli, we are compelled to
inspect other aspects of the political life. When no one
individual has the ability to routinely determine the
8 Hagan, pp. 343-346.
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position of the government, but the influential actors
gather in a single group, we are required to find out about
the consensus building ability of the group. If agreement
occurs quickly, we need to learn about the group's internal
dynamics. If there emerges difficulty in this process,
additional information is necessary. Finally, in order to
describe the operation of multiple autonomous groups, the
relationship of these associations provides us with cues. If
they do not deny each other's legitimacy, they are likely to
eventually come to an agreement. If, however, they do so, a
deadlock in the decision making process is almost
inevitable 9
.
Examining the constraints springing from inside the
regime, we need to take a look at the significance of the
relationship between the leadership and the wider political
environment. Hagan argues that "if a leadership does face
significant challenges to its position, it will likely avoid
actions that could provoke controversies that, in turn,
might help opposing political parties or other groups (e.g.,
the military) to force its removal from office". The best
way to measure regime vulnerability is to examine the
frequency of changes in the political leadership over a
particular period of time. Hagan asserts that the most
fragmented and the most vulnerable regimes will have to cope
with the greatest constraints during their operation.
9 Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, pp. 309-338.
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Symptoms of a highly constrained foreign policy behavior are
ambiguous verbal statements, inconsistent pronouncements,
controversy avoidance, and diplomacy characterized by low
intensity and occasional hostility 10
.
In addition to regime fragmentation and vulnerability,
the legitimacy of a state's institutions is also an
important aspect that needs to be taken into account. If an
institution is legitimate, the politicians or officials may
be willing to place its survival ahead of their own personal
and group interests, and accommodate internal concerns to
external pressures. If the institution lacks legitimacy,
officials are likely to despoil the state to maximize their
own selfish group interests, and block essential changes
necessary to develop an effective foreign policy 11
.
Snyder approaches the issue of regime level constraints
oft foreign policy in different terms. The least constrained
regimes are what he calls the cartelized systems in which
parochial interests have the greatest opportunity to control
state policy. In such a system bargaining among compact
groups with different, highly concentrated interests
proceeds by logrolling: each group gets what it wants most
in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies
its coalition partners desire. Each logroller has a stronger
10 Hagan, pp. 346-350.
11 Larson (1991), pp . 85-111.
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incentive to pursue its parochial interests than to promote
the collective good.
Unitary systems are more constrained than cartelized
ones. Here interests are diffuse and encompassing: the
ruling oligarchy's assets and skills are mobile across
economic and bureaucratic sectors. It has no parochial
reason to back the success of some sectors over the others,
or to engage in logrolling. As proprietor of the national
economy it has little incentive for risky policies. However,
Snyder also credits the possibility that single leaders may
slip out of control. The most constrained regime type is the
democratic one, although institutions even in such a system
may work imperfectly and create cartelized blocs within
different segments of the elected government 12
.
After concluding our investigations in the area of
structural and systemic constraints on a state's foreign
policy, we turn our attention to factors that originate on
the level of the individual. The following discussion will
be based upon the findings of cognitive psychology, belief
system, and operational code theories. We will argue that in
addition to non-personal influences, policy outcomes are
affected by idiosyncratic determinants. As opposed to the
classical rational actor model that describes states as
billiard balls or black boxes, assuming that under the same
12 Snyder ("Myths..."), pp. 21-66.
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circumstances actors handle issues with the same approach
and, supposedly, arrive at the same decision, the above
mentioned theories acknowledge the existence of individual
-
specific strategies. They contend that each person perceives
the environment differently, and different perceptions about
the world result in different actions. How do individuals
perceive the world? How do they handle incoming data? How do
they synthesize them? How do the constructed perceptions
constrain the relationship of the individual and the
environment? How do these procedures relate to political,
and especially foreign policy decision making? In order to
answer these questions, first we need to take a look at the
contributions of cognitive psychology to the issue.
According to the basic findings of cognitive
psychology, the two ultimate characteristics of human
cognition are the top-down processing of new information,
that is matching and assimilating it into preexisting
structures, and limited computational capacities, that is
the prevalence of simplifying mechanisms. These structures
or mechanisms are called schemas which are generic concepts
stored in the memory. They might be a collection of
subjective theories constructed by generalizing one's own
experiences. A subset of schemas can be called analogies
that are specific schemas, and they also operate in the
above fashion.
19
The schema structure generates prototypes against which
specific examples can be compared. It not only helps
interpret incoming data, but also allows us to go beyond
them, and its "default values" create a more complete
picture
.
There are numerous schemas stored in our mind, and they
are recalled according to the particular situation. Because
of our inclination to simplification, we tend to recall
schemas that are most readily available and for doing so we
rely on superficial commonalities without probing more
deeply or widely in search of less obvious but perhaps more
relevant patterns
. A schema choice also involves the
assessment of the fit between the incoming stimuli and the
repertoire of available schemas stored in memory. We make a
similarity judgement of the extent the situation we are
facing matches the memory evoked. Certain schemas are
destined to be more influential by personal, generational,
and career experiences; and if these factors reinforce each
other, the analogy may become extraordinarily powerful.
Once a schema has been constructed and stored in
memory, and has proved to work under specific circumstances,
modifying or altering it requires an extended exposure to
contrary experience, and it will usually not erode even if a
series of unparallels between them and reality are pointed
out
.
20
On the basis of these assumptions Khong develops an
Analogical Explanation (AE) framework in order to answer the
central question: how do analogies influence the selection
of policy alternatives? According to this theory, analogies
perform six diagnostic tasks: define the nature of the
situation confronting the policy-maker; assess the stakes;
provide prescriptions; help predict alternative options'
chances of success; evaluate their moral rightness; and warn
about dangers associated with the options 13
.
Khong claims that if it is proved that an analogy was
used at important junctures in the policy process, then we
can accept that it affected the decisions. This is the point
where research in the field of cognitive psychology relates
tooperational code theory. Operational code theory was
initiated by Nathan Leites's book "The Operational Code of
the Politburo" (1951) that was developed into a exhaustive
monograph about Bolshevism two years later. In "A Study of
Bolshevism" Leites attempted to "study the spirit of a
ruling group . .
.
[through]
. . . the analysis of [one aspect
of] . . . its doctrine . . . what (he) call(s) the operational
code, that is, the conceptions of political 'strategy'" 14
.
Sixteen years later Alexander George undertook the
development of Leites's approach to a comprehensive model
for studying political behavior and decision making. His aim
13 Khong, pp. 24-25.; Snyder ("Myths..."), pp. 26-31.
14 cited in Walker, p. 404.
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was to concentrate primarily on the "maxims of political
strategy" solely as beliefs rather than on the
psychoanalytically based, characterological aspects, and
underlined the cognitive as opposed to the affective
elements of the issue. He classified the basic beliefs of
political leaders into two groups. Whereas philosophical
beliefs refer to assumptions and premises about the
fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political
conflict, and the role of the individual in history,
instrumental beliefs focus upon ends-means relationships in
the context of political actions 15
.
George also identified two techniques to detect the
impact of operational
- code beliefs upon decisions. The core
of the model is the process tracing and the congruency
procedure. Process tracing is a methodology that shows how
the actor's beliefs and other factors influenced his
assessment of the situation and his choice of action,
whereas the congruence procedure by specifying a set of
expected outcomes based on one's theoretical perspective and
checking them against actual outcomes establishes
consistency between the content of given beliefs and the
content of decisions 16
.
Subsequent studies went a step further and attempted to
link personality, beliefs, perceptions, and foreign policy
15 George (1969), pp. 190-222.
16 George (1979), pp. 95-124.
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behavior. These investigations found several different
patterns for the relationship of the above factors. One
possible chain of causation detected by Starr suggests a
straightforward link between beliefs, perceptions, and
behavior: Beliefs --> Perceptions of the Object --> Behavior
towards the Object. However, as Walker noted, the linkages
may be more complex. "For example: the instrumental beliefs
in an individual's operational code may prescribe the same
behavior toward different types of objects. Therefore
obj ect
-percept ions would vary, but behavior would not. The
philosophical beliefs in an operational code may dispose an
actor to diagnose differently the respective situations
surrounding two objects of the same type or even the same
object at two different observation points. Therefore,
object-perceptions would not vary, but behavior would" 17
.
Both the model set up with the assistance of cognitive
psychology and the operational
- code theory builds on a
larger concept called "belief system". The ultimate
problemat ique around the entire area is the nature of the
"filtering device" of existing beliefs about empirical and
normative isues. How do these devices differentiate
important from uninportant data? To what extent are decision
makers affected by their preconceived views?
Belief systems are a set of ideas and thoughts
concerning the environment that are held relatively
17 Walker, p . 414
.
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constant. According to Holsti, belief systems have a "dual
connection with decision-making. The direct relationship is
found in that aspect of the belief system which tells us
'what ought to be', acting as a direct guide in the
establishment of goals. The indirect link ... arises from
the tendency of the individual to assimilate new perceptions
to familiar ones, and to distort what is seen in such way as
to minimize the clash with previous expectations" 18
.
When examining belief systems, many themes we have
discussed in the preceding pages reoccur. Since policies are
usually developed by a number of actors, the belief systems
or images of the individuals interact. In this case we need
to develop a collective belief system for the group which is
the aggregation of individual beliefs. When there is one
person acting as a principal force affecting the formulation
and implementation of decisions, his belief system has a
disproportionate share in the collective belief system. In
such cases the establishment of a balance of power among the
group's constituent members is helpful. In order for a
decision making group to operate effectively a minimal level
of agreement between its members' belief systems is
required. Those bodies where there is a high degree of
overlap among the individuals' belief systems are likely to
arrive at consensus rapidly, whereas worldview differences
18 cited in Little and Smith, eds
. ,
p. 12.
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result in difficulties in developing coherent policy
intragovernmentally 19
.
Throughout the preceding pages we have reviewed the
existing literature concerning the internal determinants of
foreign policy. In doing so we attempted to find the most
appropriate ways they might be helpful to understand the
relationship between these two spheres of politics. We have
pointed out, contrary to mainstream realism, that a state's
domestic conditions do exert influence on its behavior vis-
a-vis other states. Since a regime's primary goal is to stay
in office, maximize its political support and, ultimately,
its power, the adoption of any policy takes place in this
context. On the basis of these assertions we accepted the
following set of criteria:
1
. Governments in both open and closed societies are
constrained in conducting their foreign policies.
2 . The adequate method to examine the impact of domestic
structure on foreign policy is regime fragmentation and
vulnerability. The most fragmented and vulnerable states
win have to cope with the greatest constraints.
3. States with legitimate institutions are more likely to
develop an effective foreign policy than those without.
19 Rosati, pp. 15-38.
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4. If in a state parochial interests evolve and control the
state policy, they are able to ignore many of the
constraints imposed on them by the structure they operate
m. Regimes with encompassing interests or governments
surrounded by democratic- constitutional regulations
cannot easily bypass constraints.
5 . Decision making individuals are constrained by the
processes their cognition inherently follows.
6. Belief systems shared by political leaders predispose
them toward and turn them away from certain kinds of
actions
.
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CHAPTER 2
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1948
2.1 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet
Union, 1945-1948
2.1.1 The General Characteristics of Postwar Soviet
Politics Under Stalin
The condition that ultimately left an imprint on Soviet
life in the late 1940s was that after Germany, the Soviet
Union suffered the most severe devastation of all countries
during World War II. As a result of a series of formal and
informal agreements between the Soviet Union, the United
States, and Great Britain, Stalin, in return for American
Lend-Lease and British weapon and food supplies, agreed that
he would keep the German troops engaged in the Eastern front
until the other two members of the Grand Alliance had gained
sufficient strength to be able to win in the Western
front 20
. During four years of the "Great Patriotic War" the
Soviet Union lost twenty million people and approximately
$128 billion worth of industrial capital was destroyed.
The German invasion in 1941 necessitated extraordinary
measures in the political and administrational sphere. It
20 Taubman
,
pp . 41-47.
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was no longer possible to maintain strict discipline to the
extent it had been feasible during the twenties and
thirties. The bulk of the attention of the leadership and
the energy of the country had to be devoted to the war
effort. This did not bring about anything that can be
referred to as "freedom" in the Western sense, but the
loosening grip was certainly felt by the Russian (and all
the Soviet) people. Stalin had to "liberalize" many aspects
of the political system; Western influence was tolerated for
the first time since the Revolution. Derogatory articles
concerning the capitalist countries disappeared from the
newspapers and, as many contemporary observers noted, even
anti-Western jokes were banned21
. The tasks of the party and
the secret police had to be redefined; nationalist feelings
and religious sentiments were allowed to evoke the
atmosphere necessary for a successful war which was fought
not for the Party or for Communism, but for "Mother Russia".
Some degree of private initiative appeared, especially in
agriculture, in order to supply the army and the
population22
.
These unusual circumstances were highly unfavorable for
the Soviet system. The leadership in Moscow was witnessing a
dangerous disintegration of the party, first of all in the
occupied territories. In Leningrad the number of party
21 Conquest (1991), chp. 4.
22 Dunmore, p. 1.
28
members went down from 150,000 to 16,000, in the Ukraine
from 500,000 to 16,000. The structure of the society and the
administrative apparatus was either destroyed or terribly
shaken, and although there was a widespread and so far
unparalleled expectation for a genuine change in the nature
of the system, this lethal process had to be halted. It was
indispensable to eradicate laxity, restore discipline and
central control, since the very existence of the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" was at stake. It was this
party revival that became the core of Stalin's immediate
post-war policies 23
.
The political system that served as a tool in the
dictator's hand was often looked upon by Western observers
as a monolithic one with Stalin in the center and a very
small number of people around him. They have assumed that
important decisions were made solely in this narrow body,
but even within it the most significant factor was Stalin's
wish
.
In fact, in the Soviet policy making process there were
different patterns at work simultaneously. As far as the
general characteristics of the regime is concerned, it was
overwhelmingly totalitarian, centralized, and repressive.
Stalin and the Politburo were the ultimate place where
decisions were made. The input side to the system was
insignificant, there was practically no response for
23 McCagg, p. 12 0.
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pressures coming from below, or more exactly such pressures
were nonexistent. The directions issued at the supreme level
were implemented without questioning, and in order to secure
this, the state bureaucracy was constantly harassed by the
leadership's agents, the secret police, and the party
apparatus
.
However, at the organizational level the picture needs to
be refined. The bureaucracy was far more important from the
point of view of managing the entire Soviet system. The
senior administrators played a key role ensuring that
measures were carried out. Decisions were largely
predictable, since they were dictated by the official
ideology of the Party and the Politburo orders.
A third, more "pluralistic" pattern in the Soviet policy
making process meant that there were various views and
interests present at the different levels of the hierarchy,
and decisions were born as a result of compromises between
the different interest groups 24
.
There is no consensus about the precise extent of
Stalin's power in the Politburo. Even at the highest level
it is not adequate to claim that it was exclusively Stalin
whose will had an impact on the output side of Soviet
politics. On the one hand, he was practically an
unchallenged leader. His relationship with his Politburo
colleagues is most frequently presented as one between a
24 Dunmore, pp. 6-9.
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Master and his servants. Milovan Djilas recalled in his
remembrance volume that Molotov had the habit of following
Stalin wherever he went with a small notebook in his hand
and put down each of the Leader's words 25
. Stalin often
treated the Politburo members like toys: for instance in the
early fifties he excluded Molotov, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov
from Politburo meetings simply by not inviting them. If he
wanted to have a policy accepted he knew the Politburo would
not support, he asked their endorsement without letting them
know about the contents of the issue 26
.
However, the Politburo no longer consisted of
inexperienced people. They were all senior politicians;
Molotov, Andreyev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan had been members
since the twenties 27
,
and Stalin could not remove them at
will. There were no killings between 1945 and 1949, then
Voznesenskii was excluded and executed. Until 1953 there
were only two more dismissals, Popov and Andreyev, but
neither was arrested28
.
Furthermore, throughout the last decade of his life,
Stalin was suffering from recurrent bouts of debilitating
ill health, which limited his ability to supervise policy
implementation in a really detailed and sustained manner.
25 Djilas, p. 134.
26 Khrushchev, pp. 278-281.
27 Conquest (1991), pp . 105-141.
28 Dunmore, pp. 12-18.
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After his February 9, 1946 preelection speech he delivered
only one more public speech, at the Nineteenth Party
Congress in 1952, but even there he spoke only briefly and
many observers considered it merely a ceremonial appearance.
Nonetheless, he remained the supreme authority in virtually
all areas, and it seems very unlikely that anyone from the
Politburo would have dared to turn against him. Instead,
they were fighting fiercely among themselves to gain a
favorable position where they could exert more influence on
the Master's decisions 29
.
Confronting factions or groupings sharing different
ideological, philosophical assumptions within a country's
political system are generally referred to as "Left" and
"Right", and this distinction is often applied to describe
Soviet politics, as well 30
. However, traditional definitions
of political trends and approaches often prove inadequate
in relation to the Soviet Union. Disputes between the
different factions were mainly personal struggles for power
and influence, rather than moving along any particular
consistent ideological line or a specific issue - orientation
.
No policy was adopted by a group if it was backed by the
opponent, but after the outcome of the struggle had been
determined, it was safe for the victor to adopt the loser's
platform if it was considered a viable approach. The entire
29 Ra ' anan
,
p . 2 7.
30 Shulman, pp. 4-5.
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nature of these conflicts followed a "feudal" pattern:
representatives of the individual groupings invested their
subordinates, whenever possible, with power and positions in
return for personal loyalty and allegiance. They promoted
the interests of their clients, thereby increased their own
power. Ideological positions adopted on issues did not
necessarily reflect personal predilections, but rather the
obligations of various leaders to their
subordinates and allies. In order to become an accepted
leader and to gain a solid power base, it was advisable for
a person to establish himself as the only genuine and
orthodox executor of Leninism and as the sole scientific
interpreter of history with the implicit claim of
infallibility. Because of the lack of constitutional,
legitimized rules for power transfer, practically all
changes in the leadership could be achieved exclusively by
coups 31
.
Stalin, quite understandably, did little to
discourage disputes. He did not have to fight for
preeminence, he was still on top. Additionally, allowing his
principal officers to contend with one another enabled him
to disengage himself from the day-to-day "micromanagement"
of politics, to examine alternative courses of action and,
at the same time ensure that his lieutenants became less
likely to combine forces against him.
31 Ra'anan, pp. 7-11.
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2.1.2 The Main Characters beside Stalin
Until very recently sources and documents on the
background of specific Soviet political decisions, including
minutes and records of the sessions of top decision making
bodies were scarce, or completely unavailable for
researchers. As a result, discord prevails among students of
Soviet politics concerning the causes of certain policies
and the aims of individuals, especially in the Stalinist
era. As one prominent Russian analyst put it in a 1993
publication, "this article is one possible version, an
original reconstruction of historical phenomena and events,
the true fabric of which is still being carefully concealed
from the public" 32
.
According to one view, which seems to be more widely
accepted and that insists on the usual left- right
distinction, there were two distinct groupings located on
the two sides of the political palette between 1945 and
1948. The leftist group was led by Andrei Zhdanov and
Nikolai Voznesenskii
. It had built up strong ties with most
of the foreign Communist parties, especially with the
Yugoslavian and Bulgarian ones, and found its supporting
basis in the party apparatus. The rightist wing was
represented by Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beriya. This
faction that was backed by senior officials in economic
32 Alekseyev, p. 13.
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ministries, the secret police, and the Caucasian party
leaders, also had some connections with Communist parties,
but in general did not maintain close relations with foreign
parties
.
The Zhdanov group, runs the line of this interpretation
occupied a militant, dogmatic stance on foreign and domestic
issues. It instigated unalloyed hostility toward the West,
urged aggressive use of foreign communists and mass action
of the proletariat to achieve rapid subjugation in the
Eastern European countries. As opposed to this, the Malenkov
group advocated a less forward, or militant international
policy. They showed little interest in the affairs of
Eastern Europe and were less directly associated with
foreign relations 33
.
In our thesis we will develop a different train of
thought. A closer look at the main characters of these
factional debates will help elucidate the issue. Zhdanov's
political fortunes before and during the war were determined
by the successes and failures of the international ventures
he supported (he had been appointed chairman of the Supreme
Soviet s Foreign Affairs Committee in 1938)
,
and his
activity as the leader of the Leningrad Party organization.
During 1939 and 1940 he derived prestige from having been
one of the main architects of the Hitler- Stalin Pact, and
continued to defend the relationship with Berlin even after
33 Ra'anan, Shulman, etc.
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Germany had built up substantial forces along the Soviet
border. Zhdanov argued that there was no danger of a Nazi
attack, since Germany could not fight a two-front war. m
1939 he also advocated the invasion of Finland, probably
because of its strategic importance for Leningrad34
.
The debacle in Finland further discredited Zhdanov, while
the events of June, 1941 ultimately doomed his wartime
position35
.
Molotov, as the father of the Nazi
-Bolshevik pact, was
also m serious trouble. A newly established Commissariat
for State Control was given supervisory authority over the
Council of People's Commissars where Molotov was chairman,
and a deputy commissar of Foreign Affairs was appointed
beside him in the person of Andrey Vyshinskiy. Later Stalin
himself became the chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars, replacing Molotov36
.
At the same time Malenkov and Beriya, who were junior
leaders at that time, were promoted to the rank of candidate
members of the Politburo in 1941. In order to undermine
Zhdanov's reputation with Stalin, they laid the groundwork
for his transfer to the doomed city of Leningrad. This was
the nadir of Zhdanov's career, since even the abandonment of
the city was contemplated during the three-year- long siege.
34 Conquest (1991), pp. 105-141.
35 McCagg, pp. 16-17.
36 McCagg, p. 107.
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It is worthwhile to note that Leningrad always saw Moscow as
p ovincial city. Leningrad was the imperial capital, a
revolutionary center in 1825, 1905, and twice in 1917, and
its party bosses had the habit of challenging Stalin's
leadership, like Zinoviev in 1927, Kirov in 1934, or Zhdanov
in 19 4 6 37 .
During the war the role of the Politburo was de facto
taken over by a special body, the State Defense Committee.
The rivals' positions were well reflected in the composition
of that body, since Malenkov and Beriya, junior leaders who
were only candidate members of the Politburo, were included,
while Zhdanov, who had been an influential senior
politician, was excluded despite his Politburo membership38
.
By 1944 Zhdanov was again on the ascendancy after the
heroic defense of Leningrad, but since Malenkov's star was
still high he was appointed chairman of the Committee for
the Rehabilitation of the Liberated Areas and Zhdanov's
comeback had to wait. In the fall of 1944 he was moved to
Helsinki to supervise Finland's compliance with the terms of
the armistice, and he could play no role in the leadership
for several months 39
. Strangely enough, suddenly he was
relieved as first secretary of the Leningrad party
37 Hahn, p. 28.
38 Tiushkievich, pp. 368-393.; Glantz, pp. 169-188.; McCagg,
pp. 76-82., 224-225.
39 McCagg, pp. 82-86.
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organization and was elevated to Moscow exactly when a great
celebration was held in Leningrad in the honor of the "Hero
City". He was followed as Leningrad first secretary by his
protege, A. Kuznetsov40
.
2.1.3 The Main Issues of Soviet Domestic Politics Following
the War
As it has been pointed out earlier, the war brought about
an earthquake in the traditional patterns of Soviet life and
power relations. The importance and influence of the party
diminished, whereas the role of the army, the secret police,
the industry and the industrial management significantly
increased. Stalin was well aware of this serious change and
did not hesitate to act to restore the party to the role it
"deserved"
. To achieve his aim he primarily relied on the
assistance of the Zhdanov group.
Naturally it was the army that gained the greatest
prestige from the victory over the Nazis. In order to tackle
the popularity of the army, Stalin and the party revivalists
in their public speeches downgraded its role in the military
successes, and they emphasized that it was the Party,
Comrade Stalin, the great Russian people (or Soviet people,
depending on the personal predilections of the speaker)
,
and
40 Dunmore, pp. 15-17., 27.;McCagg, pp. 86-96.
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only last the army that won the war. Marshal Zhukov, the
main war hero, lost his influence and was sent to a remote
corner of the country, m February, 1946 the separate army
and navy commissariats were merged under the Armed Service
Commissariat (later Ministry) led by Stalin. There were six
deputy ministers appointed, five of whom were professional
soldiers, but the sixth, N. Bulganin, who was not a soldier,
became the political general in charge of general questions
and practically had authority over the others 41
.
During the war the NKVD gained extremely great power. It
had authority over the frontier guard, as well, and in
certain regions with the help of the GULAG administered vast
territories. It also commanded immense economic capacities.
Stalin had been suspicious about the extraordinarily
powerful secret police for a long time. Already back in 1941
the economic and security functions of the NKVD were
separated, but this did not limit Beriya's influence
significantly and he also became a member of the State
Defense Committee. When converting war industries into
peacetime duties, this empire was shaken and in 1946 Beriya
was removed from the direct supervision of the NKVD (MVD)
Although he became full member of the Politburo he was not
given a position in the executive organs of the Party42
.
41 Hahn, p. 40.
42 McCagg, p. 17.
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A third branch that had to be overshadowed was the
industry managers. Between 1941 and 1945 the vast industrial
capacities were all placed into the service of the war
effort. Traditional administrative and regulatory processes
were ignored and the industrial management became more
influential at the expense of the party. The successful
performance of the industry during the war further improved
its position. The leading figure of the industrial "lobby"
was Malenkov who was also in charge of the cadre selection
and was the member of the State Defense Committee. As has
been mentioned, in 1944 he became the chairman of the
committee directing the economic rehabilitation of the
liberated areas. After the conclusion of the war the large
scale demobilization, the transition to peacetime production
and political routines largely affected him and his power
basis. In September, 1945 the State Defense Committee was
abolished, and Malenkov had to surrender his post as deputy
chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 43
.
In the spring of 1946 all top governmental organs were
reorganized, Malenkov and Beriya became members of the
Pol itburo
,
but at the same time Kuznetsov, the Leningrad
first secretary and Popov, another Zhdanovite, secretary of
the Moscow committee, were elevated to the Secretariat 44
.
Malenkov was absent from the list of the deputy chairmen of
43 Ra'anan, p. 25.
44 Truman (vol. 1), p. 377.
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the Council of Ministers, as well. Since even the Politburo
proved to be too broad an organ for Stalin, he separated a
group of six for directing foreign policy (Politburo
Committee for Foreign Affairs)
,
which was supplemented in
October, 1946 by Voznesenskii as member in charge of
economic issues, this way transforming the "septet" into a
universal body45
.
Zhdanov participated in the party revivalist process
initiated by Stalin from the beginning. After he gave up his
position in Leningrad he became the chairman of the
Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet and was
m direct charge of Soviet relations with the foreign
Communist parties46
. In this period Stalin relied on
Zhdanov's influence in carrying out his policies against the
army, the police, and the industrial management, but he had
no intention of letting Zhdanov slip out of his fingers. The
reason why this almost happened was partly his poor health
during 1945 and 1946. The Generalissimo had two heart
attacks prior to and during the Potsdam Conference according
to President Truman47
. He spent most of the cold seasons at
the Black Sea resorts, and was absent even from the November
7 parades in 1945 and 1946. Zhdanov managed to convince
Stalin that Malenkov's activity at the cadre selection and
45 Ra'anan, p. 22.
46 Hahn, p. 46.
47 Ra'anan, p. 28.
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in other areas in the Central Committee apparat had been
wrong (although as we have seen Stalin did not really have
to be convinced)
. Zhdanov and Voznesenskii wanted to stop
the dismantling of German industries, the main task of the
Malenkov committee for the rehabilitation of the liberated
areas, so they led a campaign to investigate the operation
of the committee, which proved to be successful 48
. The
dismantling was terminated, Malenkov was suspended as
Central Committee secretary and cadres chief, and replaced
by another Zhdanov ally, Patolichev from the Chelyabinsk
organization49
.
The 1946 celebration of the Revolution was the climax of
Zhdanov's power. It was not only Stalin who was missing from
the balcony of the Lenin Mausoleum, but also Malenkov,
Beriya, Molotov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, that is
all those who were not strongly related to Zhdanov. However,
present were Zhdanov, Voznesenskii, Kuznetsov, Popov,
Patolichev, and several others from Zhdanov's immediate
circle. Even the ceremonial speech was delivered by
Zhdanov50
.
As is clear from these episodes, the most powerful leader
beside Stalin in the first two postwar years was Andrei
Zhdanov. In the next section we will explore what foreign
48 Khrushchev, pp. 246-258.
49 Ra'anan, p. 22.
50 McCagg, p. 107.
42
policy line the Soviet Union followed during the
" Zhdanovshchina"
,
as the period of Zhdanov's predominance is
often referred to.
2.1.4 The General Approach towards Foreign Policy, 1945
1946
As far as the foreign policy approaches of the individual
leading personalities are concerned we can rely upon the
series of speeches delivered in February, 1946 before the
elections to the Supreme Soviet. These speeches are usually
and rightly regarded in the West as overtures of the Cold
War, since they signalled for the first time an unmistakable
shift in the official Soviet attitude. None of the Politburo
members wanted to maintain the Grand Alliance and continue
the East-West cooperation unaltered. All of them shared the
same militant Marxist - Leninist ideological heritage and
never for a single minute had broken with their basic
hostile stance. However, there were significant differences
among the leaders concerning the extent of their hostility,
and these differences can be detected in the speeches.
The speeches of Zhdanov, Molotov, Malenkov, Beriya, and
Stalin and as well as Voznesenskii
' s announcement a few
weeks later about the new five-year plan show that Zhdanov,
Molotov, Voznesenskii, and Stalin were remarkably less
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hostile toward the West than Malenkov and Beriya. The
speeches were published in the Pravda in the following
order: Beriya (February 6) emphasized the threat of a new
imperialist war the main target of which would be the Soviet
Union, and called for the strengthening of the military-
economic might of the country; Molotov (February 7) although
underscoring international danger, viewed the world as
divided horizontally, and not vertically; Zhdanov (February
8) urged the reorientation of the economy to peacetime
production, did not mention international tension or the
possibility of a renewed armed conflict, and did not
identify imperialists with nations; Malenkov (also on
February 8) ignored the prospects for peaceful development,
and focused on the necessity of concentrating on the
military strength and heavy industry, and he laid more
emphasis on geographically defined blocs than Zhdanov.
Stalin (February 10) was more in line with Zhdanov's
remarks, like Voznesenskiy (March 16) who indicated that the
gap between the heavy and light industry would not be so
great as in regular five-year plans, although he wanted to
achieve this with voluntarist methods: he wanted to push
both heavy industry and consumer production, with regard
almost exclusively to needs as opposed to the capacities of
the economy51
.
51 Pravda articles of respective days.
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The two basic approaches towards foreign policy in
postwar Soviet politics, like in most countries, were
isolationism and participationism. As Stalin indicated to
American Ambassador in Moscow Averell Harriman in October,
1945 at the Gagry resort, there was a strong isolationist
wing present at the top level, but he himself opposed it.
Malenkov and Beriya, who were the main advocates of this
stance underscored military danger. They were closely
connected with the industrial leadership that had no
interest m getting involved in the affairs of the
imperialists
.
The participation! st line was represented by Stalin,
Zhdanov, and Molotov, partly because of the offices they
held. Molotov in his speeches on November 6, 1945 and
February, 1946 supported the reliance on the United Nations,
and called for an "anti
-blocist " continuation of the Grand
Alliance. He argued that the supposedly divided West could
be forced by diplomatic maneuvers to comply with the Soviet
wishes. Zhdanov also did not consider some cooperation
impossible, since, as it had been pointed out, he was
talking about horizontal divisions, conflicts not between
nations, but between imperialist "elements" and "the
people". In his November 7, 1946 speech he was less
optimistic, but claimed that forces working for peace were
becoming stronger and stronger. Stalin backed the
part icipat ionis ts
,
because isolationism was advocated mostly
45
by representatives of the industrial "lobby" and the
Malenkov- Beriya group he wanted to do away with anyway, in
his interviews he was almost always optimistic about the
peaceful developments, avoided mentioning the prospects of
war, and occasionally promised improvement in living
conditions in the country52
.
Stalin always remained more cautious in foreign policy
questions, he did not support adventurist lines. He made
gestures toward the West after Hitler's attack, eliminated
the Comintern in 1943 and did not revive it until 1947, and
adopted a Soviet anthem instead of the Internationale that
explicitly called the international proletariat for
struggle. Overall, he preferred salami tactics to direct
confrontation. He considered the spirit of Yalta and Potsdam
cooperative and not antagonistic. He agreed to the
establishment of the United Nations, but in return for these
concessions he expected to have the only say in Eastern
Europe. Even in his reply to Churchill's Fulton speech in
March, 1946 where he compared urging of the cooperation of
the English speaking countries to Hitler's ideas about the
superiority of the German people, he made a clear
distinction between Churchill and the current British
government, and he minimized the perception of threat by
52 McCagg, pp. 159-167.
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claiming that Churchill and his allies would not succeed in
organizing a military expedition against Eastern Europe 53
.
Stalin publicly downgraded the significance of the atomic
bomb. At Potsdam he reacted indifferently to President
Truman's hint about the existence of an extraordinarily
powerful weapon, news which seemingly did not take him by
surprise 54
. In subsequent interviews, as for instance with
Elliot Roosevelt, he never mentioned the nuclear threat 55
.
Before 1949 there was not a single article published in the
military press about atomic energy, in his answers to the
written questions submitted by the London Sunday Times staff
member Alexander Werth, he claimed that danger of a new war
did not at that time exist. He said he did believe in
friendly Soviet
-Western relations, but not in the atomic
bomb. He thought that the monopoly could not last for long,
and the use of the A-bomb would be prohibited. However,
behind the scenes there was an intense concentration of
resources on nuclear experiments and a breathless struggle
to break the American monopoly. Stalin in private never
denied that the A-bomb was a dangerous weapon and a useful
bargaining tool. "That is a powerful thing. Pow-er-ful!" -
53 Ulam (1974), pp. 408-496.; Shulman, pp. 13-51.;
Rubinstein, pp. 69-79.; Noggee-Donaldson, pp. 67-84.
54 Truman (vol. 1), p. 458.
55 Taubman, pp . 143-144., 163.
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as he once said in one of his emotional outbursts 56
. Since
he expected war sooner or later (within fifteen or twenty
years), he regarded the imbalance of power as a serious
political disadvantage and felt impelled to overcome this
period of vulnerability as swiftly as possible. Naturally,
he rejected the Baruch Plan that would have kept the nuclear
secret m American hands for three more years, and he used
the peace movement in Western Europe to evoke an anti-
American and anti
-atom atmosphere.
The dismantling of the East German industries, that is
leaving as little as possible for the West Germans in case
of a unification also fitted in the picture as long as the
future of the country was unclear57
. The application of a
militant line within the Cominform was also a useful method
of keeping the Western governments under the threat of mass
revolt at home. In a letter to Professor Razin of the Frunze
Military Academy, who had brought up the possibility of the
adaptation of a more offensive military doctrine, Stalin
wrote that once the Soviet Union tested his own atomic
weapon, it will be in a good position to assert itself. But
until then it would be silly to provoke the West 58
.
As a short conclusion of the events of 1945-1946 we can
state that these two years witnessed the gradual
56 Dj ilas
, p . 153 .
57 Shulman, pp. 21-22.
58 Ra'anan, pp. 118-122.
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deterioration of the relationship between the Western
democracies and the Soviet Union. As it has been pointed out
above, there was a consensus among the top Soviet leaders
concerning the untenability of the Grand Alliance. However,
continuous communication between East and West was
maintained, in large part due to the predominance of
part lcipat lonist forces in the leadership. Simultaneously,
the wartime and postwar agreements were interpreted
differently on the two sides of the Iron Curtain. For the
Soviet Union the Western endorsement of its need for
friendly governments along its borders meant that it was
only the Soviet Union whose interest were to be taken into
consideration in that part of the world. They assumed that
the sacrifice of millions Russians had created a legitimate
basis for them to exclude Western influence and establish
regimes following the Soviet pattern.
2.1.5 A New Approach towards Foreign Policy, 1947-1948
The communi zat ion of Eastern Europe was achieved through
distinct stages. Seton Watson, for instance, distinguishes
three stages through which Stalinist regimes came to life59
.
In the first stage there were mostly genuine coalitions
between traditional bourgeois parties and the Communists as
59 Seton- Watson, pp. 170-188.
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a result of elections or agreements among the different
political forces. Later, in the "bogus coalition" stage,
when the Communist parties gained substantial strength and
the cooperation among the parties proved to be a nuisance
for them they ousted the bourgeois parties from the
governments or the parliaments, and merged with the Social
Democratic Parties. In the final stage, in which the
monolithic, Stalinist regimes were created, the non-
communist political parties were either outlawed or stripped
9-11 facilities for exerting influence on politics,
Communists who were not educated in Stalin's court were
prosecuted and expelled or executed, and the whole
P°l^-tical
-economic structure of the country was transformed
following the Soviet pattern.
The years 1945 and 1946 passed in the spirit of genuine
coalitions in Eastern Europe and of the predominance of the
Zhdanov group and the party revivalists in Soviet domestic
politics. As we have pointed out, Zhdanov favored a relative
moderation concerning foreign relations and his
preponderance in the Politburo and the tentative endorsement
of his line by Stalin had an impact on Soviet foreign
policy
.
However, the party revival became too successful and the
Zhdanov group became too powerful for Stalin by early 1947.
The November 7, 1946 parade had a powerful psychological
impact on Stalin. He realized that allowing a faction to
50
gain such strength could endanger his own power.
Simultaneously, the East European Communist leaders were no
longer satisfied with their situation where they had to seek
consensus all the time with the bourgeois elements in the
governments and were eager to take advantage of the
closeness of the Red Army and the Soviet predominance in the
Allied Control Commissions. By mid- 1947 Stalin had
ascertained that the West, and especially the United States
had ultimately changed the policies of President Roosevelt
and no longer would make concessions in order to maintain a
safe world order. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan
were clear signs of the shift 60
.
Zhdanov also perceived the nature of these developments.
He realized that unless he adopted a much more militant
strategy he would lose the support of both Stalin and the
foreign Communists he had built up while being the chairman
of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee. In close
cooperation with the Yugoslavs he organized the revival of
the Comintern, whereas his ally, Voznesenskii set forth an
offensive program for the further development of the heavy
industry and launched an attack on the most prominent Soviet
economist, Yevgenii Varga.
The establishment of the Cominform was the direct
consequence of foreign and Soviet internal developments.
Different tactics had to be adopted by both the Zhdanov
60 Ulam (1974), pp. 456-496.; Shulman, pp . 13-80.
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start of the
group and the East European Communists. The
deterioration of Zhdanov's position is reflected by
Malenkov's inclusion in the Soviet delegation to the
founding meeting of the Cominform, but it was still Zhdanov
who was in the center. Malenkov presented only a minor
report that discussed the Soviet decrees on literature,
culture, and philosophy, that is the significant
achievements of the Zhdanovshchina
. Malenkov also had to
denounce Aleksandrov, one-time follower of Zhdanov, who had
switched sides and had gone over to Malenkov. There were no
Asian parties invited which can be explained by the fact
that Malenkov had been working in the Commission for the Far
East of the Politburo, and Zhdanov probably wanted to keep
Malenkov's clients out of the negotiations. In addition, the
Chinese were looked upon suspiciously at the time since
Stalin had not authorized Mao's military offensive 61
.
Zhdanov developed the two- camp theory and dropped his
idea about the horizontal division in the world. It can be
supposed that this change was necessary for him not to
isolate himself within the Soviet leadership. He admonished
the Western Communist parties that their collaborative
tactics had been wrong and called on them to revise their
policies from the top to the bottom. However, it needs to be
emphasized that Zhdanov intended to give a certain scope of
initiative to local party leaders, and he meant the
61 Ra'anan, pp. 101-110.
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Cominform as an informative propaganda organization, rather
than a tool for control 62
.
The result of these policies were exactly the opposite of
what had been planned. The strikes that broke out in France
and Italy were unsuccessful and ultimately undermined the
respect of the Communists. Zhdanov's designs to allow a
scope of initiative for the local leaders only fuelled
msurrectionism throughout Eastern Europe. Stalin was caught
between Western pressures and those of the insurrectionists,
and he was compelled to find a way out. Malenkov, who had
regarded the Cominform as a tool for imposing uniformity in
Eastern Europe, and Beriya, who had the "adequate" means for
regulating the naughty, offered a solution: to promote them
on the expense of Zhdanov's authority while uniformizing and
Stalinizing the satellite states 63
.
In addition to the founding of the Cominform, the Varga
represented an episode of great significance among
the events of 1947, and was an indication of a tangible
shift in the domestic balance of power. Yevgenii Varga, who
was the director of the Institute of World Economics and
World Politics published his major book "Changes in the
Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War"
in 1946. In this book he argued that capitalist governments
during the war had acquired great power over their economies
62 Hahn, pp. 25., 98.; McCagg, pp. 261-289.
63 Dunmore, p. 117.
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resources on the war
through planning to concentrate the
effort. The capitalist states retained the ability to plan
after the war which enabled them to cope more effectively
with economic crises. The difference between the capitalist
and socialist countries had diminished and they became less
objectionable for each other. Varga considered revolutions
abroad less likely and less necessary.
Varga's ideas were unchallenged during 1946 and most of
1947. Moreover, they were mostly given a warm welcome. But
by the end of 1947 the voice of the critics had become
amplified by the above outlined developments. Voznesenskii
,
already a Politburo member, attacked Varga publicly in his
book "The Wartime Economy of the USSR During the Great
Patriotic War", published in December, 1947. Zhdanov's son,
Yurii as head of the Agitprop's Science Section was
responsible for the field of economic science, and in this
capacity he presumably sanctioned the attacks.
Voznesenskii in his book claimed that the Capitalist
economies had been severely devastated, whereas the Soviet
economy had been left practically intact by the war. The
talk about planning in the West is merely a wish, since the
state had played no decisive role in the war economies of
capitalism. According to Voznesenskii, it was still the
monopolies that controlled the capitalist economic policies,
consequently, the transition from war to peacetime
production would produce crises and mass unemployment.
54
After Voznesenskii had started the attack, Varga came
under severe criticism from all directions, but he was not
executed, never arrested, and practically was not affected
by the entire hysteria measured by contemporary Soviet
standards 64
.
Stalin presumably shared some of Varga's basic ideas,
which can be inferred beside the outcome of Varga's fate
from Stalin's interview with the Republican Presidential
aspirant Harold Stassen in April, 1947. in that conversation
Stalin played the role of the interviewer and elicited
responses from Stassen concerning the prospects of the
American economy that supported the essence of Varga's
ideas, namely that state regulation of the capitalist
economy was feasible. In May, 1947 after the text of the
interview had been published in the United States, Pravda
accused the American press of altering Stalin's words. Later
the Moscow radio claimed that Stalin did not use the word
"regulation" and the actual word was "control". These words
were exactly the pivotal elements of the Varga debate. Two
and a half years later Malenkov quoted Stalin's words from
the document published in the United States and he used the
expression "regulation", removing all doubts about its
authenticity, and giving an expected answer to the
64 Hahn, pp. 84-94.
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speculations about who had been behind the changing of the
text 65
.
It was not accidental that the fall of Zhdanov and the
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform took place at the
same time. The Soviet
-Yugoslav rift had interfactional
aspects within Moscow, since Stalin was not pleased with
Zhdanov's attempts to create a power base abroad through the
Cominform organization. Stalin in January, 1948 summoned
Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations into the Kremlin and
invited Malenkov and M. Suslov, who later denounced
Voznesenskii, to the discussions. The topic of the meeting
was to be the Balkan Federation the Yugoslavs and the
Bulgarians were working on. Despite the fact that the plan
had previously been endorsed by Molotov, Stalin at the
meeting came up with serious objections. In fact he did not
oppose the idea of federations, and he even proposed that
similar federations should be established between Poland and
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, as well as between
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is more likely that
Stalin used the question of federations only as a pretext to
bring things to a head and break up Zhdanov' s Balkan cobweb
which was threatening to gain a state - organizational form
beyond being an ideological bloc. During the Moscow talks, a
few members of the Yugoslav delegation made a trip to
65 Taubman, pp. 137-142.; Tikos (1972), pp. 76-87.; Tikos
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Leningrad that ultimately infuriated Stalin, since the
Leningrad party organization was one of Zhdanov's most
important strongholds. He warned the Yugoslav leaders in a
letter written in May, 1948 that if Tito meddled into the
Soviet factional struggles, he would have no basis to object
if Stalin sent his own agents to Belgrade66
.
By that time Zhdanov was no longer in a position to save
the Yugoslavs. During the second Cominform meeting in June,
1948, where the Soviet delegation included Malenkov and
Suslov beside Zhdanov, a resolution was passed condemning
Yugoslavs for pursuing an anti-Soviet foreign policy. The
decision was published under the name of Zhdanov, which was
a humiliation similar to that of Bukharin who had been
forced to denounce his "Rightist" associates two decades
earlier. Malenkov had done the same with Aleksandrov at the
founding meeting of the Cominform67
.
Shortly after the Cominform meeting Zhdanov died,
probably under natural circumstances, and it was again
Malenkov and Beriya, as during the war, who gained the upper
hand in the factional debates. The finale of the first four
postwar years of Soviet internal politics was the Leningrad
Affair, apparently staged against Zhdanov's followers whose
cradle and center was Leningrad, the revolutionary city.
After Suslov became a member in the Secretariat, and
66 Ra'anan, pp. 137-142.; Djilas, pp. 166-169.
67 Hahn, pp. 98-99.; Ra'anan, p. 143.
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Malenkov also managed to regain his membership, they with
the help of Beriya "succeeded" in revealing a plot emanating
m Leningrad. The charges were so secret that even Politburo
members did not know about them. It was only after
Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress
in 1956 that some information leaked out about the case.
There are Western sources that refer to certain Soviet
observers who claim that the Zhdanov group was attempting to
create a separate party organization for the Russian
Federation centered in Leningrad68
. The main victims of the
purge were Voznesenskiy and Kuznetsov who were shot in 1950
along with several other secondary characters of the
story69 .
MtaTonkov and Beriya placed the final gloss on the profile
of the Cominform that resembled in almost every respect its
predecessor. By 1949 thoroughly uniformized Stalinist
regimes were established and the remnants of political
freedom were rooted out completely. The showtrials to
eliminate insurrectionist local leaders who were not willing
to give up the right for individual initiative followed the
Soviet pattern of the thirties and were coordinated by
Beriya's secret police connections. The economies of the
satellite countries were transformed along the lines of
five-year plans outlawing private ownership and enterprise.
68 Sulzberger, pp. 47-48.
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In 1949 the Council of Mutual Economic Aid was established
to isolate the Eastern European economies from Western
capitalist influence and to provide an organization to keep
them under control.
2.2 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the United
States, 1945-1948
2.2.1 American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-
1946
The United States emerged from World War II as the
preponderant country in the world. Warfare had taken place
outside the American Continent, thereby the infrastructure
remained undamaged. However, the United States, as member of
the Grand Alliance established an immense standing army and
transformed its powerful economy to concentrate on the war
effort. While these changes had been indispensable for the
victory, the disarmament and the transition to peacetime
routines created a series of tensions that affected the
political affairs of the first postwar years. Despite the
large-scale demobilization the American military was
considered the strongest because of its long-range air
force, sizeable navy, and most importantly, its nuclear
monopoly. These factors created a tangible sense of security
59
and predominance within the American leadership in the
immediate postwar months 70
.
On April 12, 1945 shortly after having taken the oath,
the new President, Harry S. Truman expressed to his Cabinet
members that he intended to continue the late Franklin
Roosevelt's policies, but also made it clear that he would
be President in his own right. Although before he became
Vice President he had been working in the Senate for ten
years and maintained a broad set of connections in the
legislative body and among the close colleagues of
Roosevelt, some of his new advisors had uneasy feelings
concerning Truman as President. Admiral Leahy was afraid
that for a man so "completely inexperienced in international
affairs" certain difficult issues might prove insoluble, and
even General Marshall said that "only time could tell what
he was really like" 71
. However, Truman was not absolutely
ignorant about the situation of his country. As a Senator he
was the chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the
National Defense Program whose creation he proposed, and
while coordinating its operation he got to know almost
everything about the American war effort 72 .
Besides, he had spent most of his youth reading books on
history after he had been prescribed strong glasses which
70 Ambrose, pp. 92-121.
71 Druks, p. 9.
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had prevented him from participating in the dangerous games
of kids of his age 73 . He still vividly remembered the
failure of the League of Nations to stop the Japanese in
Manchuria, the Italians in Ethiopia, the Germans in the
Rhineland or Czechoslovakia, and the Spanish Civil War, and
concluded that all these debacles had originated in the
United States' refusal to join the League. He often recalled
that after 1933 isolationism was furthered by both the
Democrats and the Republicans, and that position was
abandoned only after the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Truman
also felt the need for an adequate preparedness for defense,
because he viewed that democracy had to be ready to defend
itself against dictatorship. In relation to the Russians he
had for long espoused a rather strong anti
- Communist stance,
and remained throughout the war of the opinion that the
Soviet Union was a difficult wartime ally and would be a
"troublesome peacetime partner". He considered upholding of
the Yalta agreements and turning back the tide of
isolationism in America his cardinal foreign policy task74
.
One of Truman's first and most important decisions was
the appointment of James Byrnes Secretary of State. Byrnes
had been Senator between 1931 and 1941 when he was proposed
by Roosevelt to the Supreme Court, but shortly after that as
the United States entered the war the President asked him to
73 Truman (vol . 1), pp. 13 5., 13 8-141.
74 Truman (vol. 1), p. 175.
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give up his lifetime position and become the leader of the
Office of Economic Stabilization. In 1943 he was elevated
even higher, and became the chairman of the Office of War
Mobilization which meant, according to many observers that
Byrnes was the "Assistant President" in charge of domestic
affairs. One of the most important episodes that strongly
affected his relationship with the new President had been
Roosevelt's decision to nominate Truman for the Vice
Presidency instead of Byrnes. Now that Truman became
President he clearly wanted to make that affair up to Byrnes
and appointed him Secretary of State who was to succeed him
as President in case he died (since the elected President
was not alive)
. But Byrnes probably never forgot that
actually he could have been President at the moment and not
Truman75
.
Byrnes was considered an expert on the Yalta Conference,
mainly because no official minutes about the secret
conversations existed. Truman asked Byrnes to transcribe the
shorthand notes he had made during the Conference and share
it with him, which happened on April 23, 1945. During their
conversation that day since both of them were already in
possession of the atomic secret, Byrnes was of the opinion
that the circumstances would enable the United States to
dictate its own terms.
75 Truman (vol . 1), pp. 34-35., 214-217.
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April 23 was also the day of a significant meeting of
Truman with his top military advisors and with Molotov who
arrived to participate in the San Francisco Conference.
According to Admiral Leahy there was a consensus of opinions
among the advisors that the United States should take a firm
stand in affairs concerning the Soviet Union76
. However, two
of the participants warned about the possible consequences
of such policies. Secretary Stimson, who favored the
balance- of -power approach to world politics and considered
the acceptance of spheres of influence a way to avoid
collision with the Soviets, called for cautiousness, and
proposed that the settlement of territorial acquisitions and
the question of the influence the great powers could exert
in Eastern Europe must precede the establishment of the
United Nations 77
. General Marshall also advised Truman to
exercise more caution, because the Soviets might delay entry
into the Pacific war until the United States had carried out
the dirty work78
.
Stalin's decision to refuse to send Molotov to the San
Francisco Conference as a response to Western objections
about his policies in Poland also pushed Truman toward a
stiffer stance. Ambassador Harriman, to resolve the
conflict, suggested to Stalin that Molotov's participation
76 Leahy, April 23, 1945
77 Schlesinger, p. 234.
78 LaFeber, pp. 96., 98-100.
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would be a step in the right direction. He even offered a
special plane to get the Soviet Foreign Minister to San
Francisco. The Generalissimo finally gave in. Beside
Harriman' s efforts it is likely that Stalin was more than
curious about the new President and wanted to get first hand
information about him. If that was his intention he got it.
Already in possession of a full knowledge about the atomic
experiments and after meeting with Harriman where they had
agreed that it had been time to "make it plain to the Soviet
government" that the United States would not forever allow
the Soviet Union to do anything it wanted, Truman talked to
Molotov in a language that shocked even Charles Bohlen, his
interpreter, who was otherwise pleased by this bluntness.
But it was not only Harriman who convinced Truman about the
necessity of a firm stance79
. Bernard Baruch in his report
to the President believed that the Soviet Union could be
handled if "we kept our promises and insisted that Russia do
the same, and if we had a concise grasp of our policy". A
friendly firmness, a strict control of Germany, a new peace
making machinery, and aid to Britain would result in a
stable and acceptable world order80 .
President Truman kept this advice especially in relation
to the United Nations, but in this area he cooperated with
another character who did not make it easier for his pro-
79 Druks, p. 35.
80 Baruch, pp. 357-358.
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Soviet sentiments, if there were any, to come into the
foreground. Prime Minister Churchill proposed that the
Western allies should retain the occupied territories
together with Berlin, Prague and Vienna to gain a more
advantageous position during the subsequent negotiations,
but Truman asked how could America expect Stalin observe the
agreements if itself broke them. Nevertheless, Churchill's
remarks probably helped Truman at the San Francisco
Conference to refuse to yield to the Soviet demands, because
he remembered the failure of the League of Nations and knew
that an effective Charter was indispensable. Churchill also
wanted an early Big-Three meeting to negotiate from a more
favorable position, but Truman decided on postponement.
There were several domestic questions and budgetary problems
to be solved, he had a new Secretary of State, but most
importantly he wanted to give those working on the atomic
bomb more time so that he could negotiate in possession of
the good news 81
.
Although within the highest circles the new approach
toward the Soviets was already being formulated, the
American public, which is an important component to be taken
into account during policy formulation, was still so
friendly to the Russians that they did not even want to hear
about accusations. During the 1945 Congressional debates
only a few Congressmen warned against a Soviet danger, and
81 Stimson, May 12, 1945.
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said that those who
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes
claimed that the Soviet Union was dangerous were the same
who had not expected Hitler to attack us. According to
General Eisenhower cooperation with the Russians was
possible, and greater contact would lead to greater
understanding 82
.
Truman himself also did not want to take a hostile stance
until he was sure that the Soviets did not want to
cooperate, but also wanted to retain the support of Britain.
Therefore he decided to dispatch missions to Stalin and
Churchill as a preparation for the Potsdam Conference and as
reassurance that he advocated cooperation. Harry Hopkins,
Roosevelt's all-purpose troubleshooter and Joseph Davies,
former Ambassador to Moscow were both pro-Russian and anti-
colonialist diplomats and a right choice to carry out the
President's intentions.
Hopkins was always optimistic about the policies of the
Russians, and considered that everything should be done to
promote the Big-Three cooperation. As Charles Bohlen noted,
no one tried harder to preserve the wartime alliance.
Hopkins had a mild, but successful negotiation with Stalin.
They came to an agreement on the Polish issue, Stalin
accepted the right for a free debate in the General Assembly
of the United Nations and again promised a Soviet entry into
the Pacific war. Hopkins also explained to Stalin that the
82 Druks, pp. 42-43
.
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abrupt termination of the Lend-Lease was only a procedural
mistake. However, Harriman felt that Stalin would never
"fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter
of principle" 83
.
Davies interpreted Truman's views to Churchill, namely
that the world situation was dangerous due to the
disagreements concerning the Yalta provisions. Churchill
warned that a "steel curtain" was being built between
Eastern and Western Europe, and because of this the United
States should keep its forces on the Old Continent and
retain the currently occupied territories. He also signalled
that in case America failed to do so, Britain still had
superior air power and it was still difficult to cross the
Channel. Davies reiterated Truman's intention to carry out
the Yalta agreement and expressed his shock at Britain's
attitude toward the Soviet Union84
.
However, after the Postdam Conference, where Truman was
informed about the successful explosion of the atomic bomb
which made him boss the whole meeting, as Churchill
observed, the President had a much clearer picture about the
Soviet ambitions 85
. He ultimately concluded that the Soviets
were aiming to expand not only in Europe, but also toward
83 Bohlen, p. 243.; Vandenberg, pp. 173-174., 182., 186-193.
84 Druks
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the Middle East and North Africa, but he also thought that a
great deal of it was only a bluff 86
.
Stalin maintained his promise to declare war on Japan,
which was still considered necessary. On June 18 General
Marshall advised the President that a Soviet entry would be
a "decisive action levering them (Japan) into capitulation".
Admiral King was hesitant whether it was really necessary,
but the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 21 repeatedly
advocated the Russian participation. Marshall said if
America fought alone nothing would prevent the Soviet Union
from marching right into Manchuria and taking whatever they
wanted. During the Potsdam Conference on July 29 Molotov
proposed that the United States should publicly invite the
Soviet Union to enter, which, naturally, was immediately
rejected by Truman87
.
Nonetheless, the Soviets declared war on Japan as
scheduled, and after the two nuclear attacks the Japanese
surrendered a year earlier than it had been expected in
April
.
During the immediate postwar months there was a
continuous communication between the members of the former
Grand Alliance. The scene of these negotiations was the
Council of Foreign Ministers established at Potsdam, but
86 Truman (vol
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Which proved to be basically futile apart from the
conclusion of the peace terms with the former Nazi
satellites
.
Furthermore, the first two Foreign ministers' Conferences
provided certain events which contributed to Secretary
Byrnes's subsequent replacement. The London Foreign
Ministers Conference in October, 1945 adjourned without any
result fundamentally because of Molotov's intransigence, but
before all channels had been tried to reach some compromise,
Byrnes, without consulting the President or the members of
the delegation, persuaded the Chinese Minister to declare
the conference ended. On their way home from London Byrnes
indicated his uneasiness about his decision, but this time
no consequences followed. Ambassador Harriman visited Stalin
at the Black Sea after the futile Conference, and they
succeeded in establishing some basis for compromise 88
.
Byrnes did not want to miss the opportunity to repair his
London mistake, and called for a Foreign Ministers Meeting
to Moscow, but against the advice of senior diplomats. Prior
to his departure he briefed a number of Senators on his plan
to get Soviet approval to create an atomic energy commission
under the authority of the United Nations. The Senators felt
that Byrnes wanted to share information about nuclear
experiments with the Russians before establishing adequate
institutions for inspection. They asked the President about
88 Bohlen, pp. 246-247.; McCagg, pp. 160-161.
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his intentions and Truman reassured them that he would not
give out atomic secrets. He cabled Byrnes not to do so, and
Byrnes cabled back that he agreed89
.
The atmosphere of the December, 1945 Moscow Conference
was far from pleasant. Byrnes had not suggested the
participation of the French to please Stalin, and Bevin also
was sidetracked during most of the discussions. The whole
Conference was hastily improvized, thoroughly disorganized,
and items were put on the agenda without proper preparation.
Byrnes ran much of the negotiations from his own head.
Furthermore, the Secretary was not sending back regular
reports to the President as had been the case in other
conferences. When Bohlen, his aide and interpreter asked
why, Byrnes replied sharply that he knew when to report.
That time his performance had serious consequences. The
press declared the Moscow Conference an "eastern Munich" and
Byrnes a new Chamberlain, because he agreed to a partial
broadening of the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments, which
was a retreat from the Yalta agreements 90
.
However, his main critic was the President himself. He
was infuriated because of Byrnes's one-man show, and because
he ignored Ambassador Harriman. According to Harriman and
Samuel Rosenmann, counsel to the President, Byrnes behaved
independently because he was jealous of Truman and he
89 Truman (vol. 1), pp. 547-548.
90 Druks, p. 89
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thought that Truman had stolen the Presidency from him.
Leahy reported that Truman was angry because Byrnes had not
consulted with him about the Moscow agreements, and the
Secretary was trying to lead the American foreign policy in
a direction the President could not accept 91
. Byrnes's
personal style was to operate as a loner, keeping matters
restricted to a small circle of advisers, which method
inevitably conflicted with Truman's strong views on the
prerogatives of the President. Besides, Byrnes was
considerably senior to Truman in the Democratic Party, so he
might have felt that he was entitled to have an independent
position. Truman wrote him a letter and read it out to him
(he denies it) in which the President expressed his
discontent about the Secretary's manner of conducting
policy. He reiterated that he opposed extending recognition
to Bulgaria and Rumania unless the governments of those
countries included all democratic elements. Truman felt
there would be war unless the Soviet Union was faced with
determined resistance. That was the time when Truman decided
to replace Byrnes with Marshall, as soon as the General
accomplished his mission in China92
.
During 1945 and 1946 advisors of the President
continuously worked on assessing Soviet intentions and the
military power that would support the particular policies.
91 Leahy, December 28, 1945.
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According to one of the most characteristic estimates set
forth by Rear Admiral Inglis, Chief of Naval intelligence,
the Soviet land armies were powerful enough to take over all
of Europe except the British Isles, the Middle East, and
North Africa, but the they would not fight until they had
reconstructed their economy and transportation, stockpiled
an atomic arsenal, and consolidated their position in
Eastern Europe. As Inglis pointed out, there were more than
ten million people in forced labor camps in the Soviet
Union, and much of the army was kept abroad because there
was not enough food and accommodation at home93 .
George Kennan, Charge d' Affaires in Moscow also believed
that the Soviet union was bent upon disrupting the American
society and destroying the American international authority
to secure its power, but not by war. According to Harriman,
Russia would not provoke war if it realized that the United
States would not make endless concessions. But if not met
with a firm resistance and not contained at all fronts,
Communism would not hesitate to take over power in all of
Europe94 .
These opinions were supported by the events of the
Iranian crisis. The State Department correctly assessed the
situation as different from that in Eastern Europe. In Iran
there was no pro- Soviet government on power that could have
93 Druks, p. 95.
94 Kennan (1964), pp. 285-314.
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objected to the "meddling into their internal affairs".
Furthermore, the Soviets were met by a united opposition in
the UN Security Council and they had no choice but to yield
on the issue”. Credit should be given to Byrnes who had the
courage to throw the full support of the United States
behind such a small country on the border of the Soviet
Union96
.
The Paris Peace Conference that took place between July
and October, 1946 was the only negotiation where the Soviet
and American delegations achieved genuine results but also
it was during that conference when one of the most peculiar
episodes of Truman's first Presidential term happened.
Henry Wallace was a prominent representative of the New
Deal, he had been Secretary of Agriculture and later Vice
President for Roosevelt, and Truman retained him in his
Cabinet as Secretary of Commerce. He had always opposed the
firm stance toward Russia taken by the Truman
administration, but in 1945 he generally remained quiet in
his critiques. However, after the Fulton speech he thought
Churchill was taking advantage of Truman's hospitality and
was trying to force his own militancy on the President.
Wallace in a letter to the Mexican President wrote that
Churchill insulted Truman by trying to imply that the
95 Bohlen, pp . 251-252.
96 Bohlen, p. 257.
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President's presence meant an endorsement of the speech
which had conveyed that "intervention in Europe was
advisable when Anglo-American forces were strengthened", in
a letter to Truman on March 14, 1946 which was not answered,
and in another one written in July, Wallace warned the
President about the danger of a new war and called on him to
share the nuclear secrets with the Russians and to destroy
all atomic weapons. He believed relations could be improved
by extending economic contacts 97
.
Truman answered in a cordial manner, but felt that
Wallace was willing to give in to the Soviets to achieve
better world situation. Finally, on September 12, in a
speech in Madison Square Garden Wallace launched an all-out
attack on the administration's foreign policy. He criticized
Truman s "get-tough" policy and the military, claiming that
"only the United Nations should have atomic bombs and its
military establishment should give special emphasis to air
power. It should have control of the strategically located
air bases with which the United States and Britain have
encircled the world" 98
.
According to Karl Schmidt Truman knew all about the
speech, since Wallace had showed it to him and had read the
text out 99 . Wallace in his diary recalled the encounter as
97 Yarnell
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follows: "At the meeting with the President I went over page
by page with him my Madison Square Garden speech to be given
on September 12. Again and again he said, "That's right";
Yes, that is what I believe." He did't have a single change
to suggest. He twice said how deeply he appreciated my
courtesy in showing him my speech before I gave it... The
President apparently saw no inconsistency between my speech
and what Byrnes was doingh - if he did, he did't indicate it
in any way..." 100 Truman denied this, saying that when they
met on September 10, they were talking about issues
unrelated to foreign policy, and Wallace mentioned his
planned speech only in the last part of the conversation
when there was no time left for him to read it even in
parts. He simply welcomed Wallace's intention to deliver a
speech. After the speech, Truman told reporters answering a
question that he had approved of the whole speech, but on
September 14 when tensions were going high he had to issue a
communique stating that he had been misunderstood and there
had been no change in the administration's foreign
policy 101 .
It is inconceivable that the President would have
endorsed the speech if he had carefully read it, but
Wallace's view could not be a surprise for him after the two
letters he had received.
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John Foster Dulles, the leading Republican foreign policy
expert was disturbed by the incident, and he wrote Senator
Taft that if the Russians perceived that the United States
was divided it might increase chances of war. According to
the Republican National Committee, Truman "betrayed Mr.
Byrnes and was bidding for the support of the CIO Political
Action Committee which favored appeasing the Russians abroad
and promoting communism at home". Although Senator
Vandenberg reiterated that Republicans would continue to
support bi-partisan foreign policy, he indicated that they
could cooperate with only "one Secretary of State at a
time
. Senator Connally, a leading Democrat on foreign
affairs insisted that in the present situation there was no
room for "partisan politics or intraparty division or
personal ambition". Meanwhile, Wallace released the letters
he had written to the President in March and July which made
it clear that Truman had been aware of his Secretary's
foreign policy views 102 .
The whole affair was especially awkward for the
administration because Byrnes was in the middle of the peace
negotiations that for the first time appeared to be
successful, and Bernard Baruch was working on the American
proposal on atomic energy to the United Nations. Byrnes
threatened to quit if Wallace's activity would be tolerated,
and the next day Wallace was fired. He was replaced by
102 Druks, pp. 106-107.
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Averell Harriman as Secretary of Commerce which was a clear
indication that Truman was not willing to modify his
stance 103
.
In concluding our treatment of the first two postwar
years in American foreign policy formation we can point out
that although Truman identified himself with most of
Roosevelt's policies, he was compelled to seek a new foreign
policy approach on the one hand by the changed international
situation, and by the largely uncompromising attitude of
most of his top advisors. He could no longer count on the
Russians as allies, but channels of communication and
cooperation were still maintained and used by both sides.
The Soviet Union was seen as an expansionist power with a
large military establishment, but also as one with serious
economic problems, and it was believed by taking a firm
stance the expansion could be contained.
2.2.2 Change in American Domestic Politics and Foreign
Policy, 1947-1948
Act II of Truman's first term started with the debacle of
the Democratic Party at the 1946 Congressional elections.
The President at the time seemed very weak, and chances for
his renomination were slight. The Republican gains meant a
103 Truman (vol. 1), pp . 614-615.
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divided government for 1947-1948 and indicated a Republican
victory for 1948. The Democrats were defeated for several
reasons. After four years of war substantial savings had
accumulated with the population because of the wartime
restraints, people were eager to buy commodities that had
been scarce during the war, but there was a shortage of
practically all goods. There were severe housing problems,
thousands of veterans were homeless. Furthermore, the 1946
removal of price control caused high inflation which
threatened the savings of the population.
The administration got into conflict with the traditional
supporters of the Democratic Party, as well. In 1946, 116
million man-days of work were lost due to strikes in the
auto and steel industries and at the railways. Truman took
an uncompromising stance with the strikers, which was judged
as a curtailment of basic freedoms even by politicians like
Senator Taft who was not famous for being fond of labor
organizations. The exodus of New Dealers from the Cabinet
and their replacement often with undistinguished friends of
Truman resulted in the disaffection of many liberals 104
.
The bloc of Southern Democrats and conservative
Republicans which had represented an opposition since the
Seventy Eighth Congress between 1944 and 1946 now gained
substantial strength.
104 Hartman, pp. 3-7.
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The Republicans after a negative campaign came up with
their own legislative program based on tax reduction and
drastic cut in federal spending, and with relatively slight
emphasis on foreign policy. Senator Taft, the Republican
leader in his January 3, 1946 radio speech devoted only a
very short time to that area, predicting Congressional
resistance to large-scale foreign assistance and tariff
reductions, but favored the continuation of bi-partisanship
endorsed by senator Vandenberg 105
.
Taft's leadership did not extend to foreign policy
questions. A strategic "division of labor" existed between
him and Vandenberg, who expressed his confidence in Taft's
dominance in domestic issues, while Taft for this reason
shared his power with him. Vandenberg' s counterpart in the
House Foreign Affairs Committee was Charles Eaton who was
also supporter of internationalism and bi-partisanship and
who proved to be a key figure beside Vandenberg in creating
a smooth cooperation between the Congress and the
administration 106
.
In working out its own legislative agenda recovering
after the election defeat, the administration identified
itself with the report made by White House staff member
James Rowe, Jr. Rowe considered the clash between the
105 Hartman, pp. 10-12., The New York Times, January 20,
1947, p. 1.
106 Vandenberg, pp. 318-319.
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President and the Congress inevitable, for this reason he
recommended that Truman prepare his proposals on legislation
in as general a manner as possible and in a conciliatory
tone. According to Rowe the President should insist on bi-
partisan cooperation and avoid emphasizing differences
between programs of the administration and the Congressional
maj ority 107
.
Prospects for a successful performance were not
favorable. There were heated intraparty debates among
Democrats, and Truman did not enjoy much respect. Senator
Fulbright proposed that the President appoint a Republican
Secretary of State and then resign. Former Speaker of the
House Sam Rayburn refused to be the minority leader, and he
accepted the post only after strong White House pressures.
All this convinced Truman to set forth a moderate
legislative program108
.
Meanwhile Henry Wallace got into the limelight. Although
throughout most of 1947 he denied that he intended to lead a
third party, during his visits abroad he continued his
attack on Truman and started to indicate that he would not
support him in 1948. The White house wanted to be very
careful with Wallace, since for a great number of voters he
was still associated with the New Deal, but it was also
107 Hartman, P. 17 .
108 Hartman, P. 18 .
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calculated that his sharp attacks might alienate the voters
rather than winning a larger support 109
.
The first five months of the Congress passed in a
conciliatory atmosphere mainly because of the intraparty
conflicts of the GOP delayed the presentation of the
controversial parts of their program on tax and labor
legislation.
Tranquil relations between the President and the Congress
during the first months of 1947 extended into the area of
foreign affairs, as well. The appointment of General
Marshall to replace Byrnes as Secretary of State also was a
factor that helped maintain bi-partisanship, and enjoying
the support of Vandenberg and Eaton. The Greek-Turkish Aid,
the peace treaties with the former Nazi-allies, a relief aid
for Europe, and the National Security Act successfully went
through the Congressional procedures 110
.
Although most Republicans were firmly anti
- Communist and
politically internationalist, they were reluctant to spend
the money of the taxpayers abroad and were skeptical about
"free trade" in general. This was manifested in the
rejection of the original form of the reciprocal
- trade
program, and the United States could join the GATT only
after the agreements of a series of special negotiations
109 Yarnell, pp. 14-19.
110 Bohlen, pp. 258-259.
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between the State Department and the Republicans had been
included in an executive order 111
.
The tough times for Truman in the Congress came after
changes in the world policy trends necessitated a new
approach, which required Congressional authorization.
When Ambassador Smith asked Stalin "How far is Russia
going to go?", the Generalissimo replied "We're not going
much further" 112
. Approximately that was the extent the
United States government was familiar with Soviet
intentions, and we are not much more informed at this
moment, either. Nonetheless, the administration's response
to the British announcement of their inability to maintain
support of Greece, and to the Russian diplomatic pressures
on Turkey concerning the Black Sea straits was a dramatic
but predictable continuation of the foreign policy shift
initiated shortly after the conclusion of the war. America
assumed Britain's responsibilities in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and maybe the only dissident was George
Kennan who regarded the Soviet threat as political and
economic. He opposed giving military assistance to Turkey
that might provoke the Russians, but supported an economic
and political aid to Greece 113 .
111 Hartman, pp. 49-53.
112 Smith, Walter B., pp. 53-54.
113 Kennan (1964), pp. 332-339.
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After consulting Harriman, Under Secretary of State
Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Truman decided
to appear before the Congress. Vandenberg also summoned a
meeting of the Republican Policy Conference and asked the
Senators to endorse the President's proposal. Truman knew
that the Congress would not support his aid plan unless
confronted with the situation in a way that they could not
reject it. Meeting with Congressional leaders on February
27, Acheson presented a dramatic situation in the
Mediterranean and all over the world, and although the
participants of the meeting were impressed, Vandenberg still
insisted that in order to secure success the President
should "scare the hell out of the people". When Marshall
received the draft of Truman's speech the President was to
deliver before the Congress, he felt that there was a little
too much anti - Communism in it, but his reservations were
rejected on the basis of the arguments mentioned above.
Kennan and Bohlen were also taken by surprise by the
sweeping and uncompromising tone of the speech 114 .
The Congress was confronted with a situation where
opposition to the bill meant appeasing Communism115 . Despite
this, many critics feared that the United States would
commit itself to an excessively broad policy of intervention
and foreign aid, and that bypassing the United Nations and
114 Kennan (1964), pp. 338-339.; Bohlen, p. 2 61.
115 Ambrose, pp. 124-134.
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acting against the Soviet Union would lead to war.
Vandenberg also joined the critics, since he saw bi-
partisanship violated because the President had not
consulted the Republicans prior to making his decision about
the aid. He also claimed that the administration was too
slow in dealing with Britain's economic decline, and the
situation was so grave that only a Truman-Stalin meeting
could save the possibilities of an American- Soviet
cooperation 116
. While some Senators accused the President of
endangering the security of the United States by breaking
with the traditional foreign policy line, others, like
Senator Fulbright said the bill did not go far enough and an
overall Middle East policy was necessary. He called for the
clarification of the American determination to resist "any
attempt on Russia's part to destroy liberty and freedom",
and said that it was necessary to establish a Federation of
Europe 117
.
Senator Claude Pepper, who rallied behind Wallace's
movement objected to the belligerent tone of Truman's speech
and feared that the bill would make reconciliation with
Russia impossible. Wallace himself accused the President of
"whipping up anti - Communist hysteria", while others were
afraid that the aid program would necessitate instituting
strict controls and would result in strengthening the
116 Druks, p. 106.
117 Druks, p. 138.
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executive power. To reassure uneasy legislators and the
public, Acheson at the committee hearings placed limits on
the universal character of the proposal by binding it to the
current issue in the Mediterranean, while senators
Vandenberg and Connally drafted amendments enabling the
United Nations to terminate the program if it considered it
unnecessary or unfavorable. By passing the bill isolationism
was broken in America, and Truman took the offensive in the
Cold War 118
.
In a parallel legislation to extend UNRRA aid to European
countries, which plan lacked the strong anti
- Communist
potential, the administration had to face a much more
substantial resistance, and the originally proposed $350
million was cut to $200 million 119
.
The peace treaties with former Nazi-allies did not
represent a major issue and did not stir significant debate.
The main topic of the objections raised by Senator Fulbright
Weis that endorsing Soviet gains would leave countries,
especially Italy, vulnerable to Communism, as the example of
Hungary showed in May, 1947 120
.
The Plan to unify the armed forces under one department
had been on the agenda since the end of the war, but
consensus between the Army and the Navy was not reached
118 Druks, p. 142.; Acheson, p. 225.
119 Hartman, p. 65.
120 Hartman, p. 67.
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until January, 1947, and then after a short Congressional
debate the National Security Act was passed 121
.
Having finished the most important foreign policy issues,
Congress set to put the final gloss on its domestic agenda.
The Republicans managed to settle their factional disputes
that had prevented them from presenting controversial
proposals. Truman also had to break with his conciliatory
posture since he strongly opposed the Republican views on
the upcoming issues 122
. Furthermore, in the summer of 1947
he was advised to decide what he wanted to do with Wallace,
because since the passing of the Truman Doctrine and the
announcement of the Marshall Plan there had been a growing
distance between the policy of the administration and
Wallace's declarations. In a memo to Clark Clifford, sent by
his aide George Elsey the administration was called for
action. Elsey perceived a substantial crowd of supporters
behind Wallace consisting of isolationists, conservatives,
and Communists, who feared that Truman's policies meant war.
Elsey also considered Wallace a potential Presidential
candidate for 1948 123
. Wallace was gaining some followers
even in the Congress in the person of Senator Glen Taylor
and Senator Claude Pepper, and he could be proud of enjoying
121 Truman (vol. 2), pp. 63-79.
122 Hartman, p. 71.
123 Elsey Memo to Clifford, "Cooperation - Or Conflict? - The
President's Relationship With and Opposition Congress". December
1946, in Clifford Papers, noted in Hartman, p. 75.
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the support of other distinguished personalities, like
Albert Einstein who had expressed his admiration about
Wallace's policies in a letter written in September,
194 6 124 .
inip9-ct of this shift within the administration toward
a tougher stance concerning the Wallace affair was certainly
present at the Presidential veto of the Taft-Hartley bill in
June, 1947. Traditionally the firmest support for the
Democratic Party came from the organized labor, but certain
measures of Truman during the 1946 railroad strikes had
alienated the workers from the Democrats. After the Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley bill, the probability that workers
would line up behind a third party became very high. The
bill provided for sweeping changes in labor policy.
Jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts were
prohibited, inter- industry bargaining was banned, and rights
of the unions were curbed. Although major provisions were
amended out, the veto was still inevitable for Truman to
enhance his image as the defender of the common man. Wallace
himself admitted that the veto was an important action to
save the support of organized labor for the Democrats 125 .
The central issue of Truman's foreign policy in the fall
of 1947 and in the spring of 1948 was the European Recovery
Program. Secretary of State Marshall late in April, 1947,
124 Yarnen
; pp. 58., 62., 12.
125 Truman (vol. 2), pp. 45., 542.
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upon arriving home from an abortive Foreign Ministers'
Conference in Moscow presented to the President a report
outlining his conviction that the Soviets were determined to
take advantage of Europe's helpless economic situation. In
Moscow Marshall came to the conclusion that Stalin, looking
over to Europe saw that the best way to advance Soviet
interests in the West was to let matters drift, let the
devastated European economy go bankrupt by intransigence and
-^^fusing to cooperate. The Generalissimo showed indifference
about the futility of the negotiations: "We may agree the
next time, or if not then, the time after that". The plan to
combat the situation was first outlined by Acheson in a
speech delivered on May 8, but which did not get much
publicity 126 .
Although Vandenberg and Eaton agreed on the necessity of
a large-scale aid program, and Harold Stassen, Republican
Presidential aspirant also called the GOP to rise above
"petty grievances" and fixed opposition concerning that
issue, the Marshall aid package still had a long way to go
till acceptance. First of all, the Administration was not
prepared to include the Soviet Union and its satellites into
the program, since it would have made it unacceptable for
the Congress. Although the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris
talks eliminated the greatest obstacle to the passage, the
Congress was still far from being convinced. The President
126 Bohlen, pp. 262-263.
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as well was reserved in his declarations until September
because the recent vetoes and amendments did not create a
favorable atmosphere to stir isolationist sentiments and
promote proposals requiring large expenses 127
.
But by September-October the Soviet Union appeared more
hostile for the Americans. Numerous Congressmen returned
from their European trips with the first-hand experience
about the economic situation of the Old Continent, while the
Soviets revived the Comintern which encouraged the Western
Communists to instigate strikes, especially in France and
Italy. Truman requested the Appropriations and Foreign
Affairs Committees to consider the need for and urgent aid
to Europe, and he signalled that $580 million was necessary
for France, Italy, and Austria to survive the winter. He was
pressed by Clifford and others to summon a special session,
which he did calling the Congress to reconvene on November
17 . Since July the special committee concluded their
investigations and the President could appear before the
Congress with concrete plans 128
.
During the special session only the interim aid was
discussed, because the lack of sufficient support in the
Congress prevented the administration from presenting a
large-scale assistance program. Senator Taft, and Clarence
Brown, the Director of the Republican National Committee
127 Hartman, pp. 102-109.
128 Hartman, pp. 107-112.
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attacked Truman's policies in Germany because they wrecked
Europe, and now the American taxpayer was paying for the
mistakes. Other opponents emphasized inflationary problems,
and the rise in the cost of living. They reminded the
President that he had opposed socialism in Greece, but now
he was ready to promote it in Britain or France. Senators
Pepper and Taylor objected to the bill as a "weapon in an
ideological war", and wanted to send the proposition over to
the United Nations. Finally the bill for aid of $540 million
was passed. As a result of a Republican amendment an aid to
China was included in this sum at the expense of the
European countries 129 .
Separate treatment of the interim aid meant additional
expenses, but at the same time allowed the administration to
gain further support for the long-range plan, and the
President on December 19, 1947 asked the Congress to provide
$17 billion over a four year period for the European
Recovery Program 130 .
By the end of 1947 Truman succeeded in restoring his
liberal image, and public opinion endorsed his ventures in
foreign policy. Henry Wallace had no choice but to break
with the Democratic Party and join a new political movement.
The first indication in the direction of this shift came in
129 Hartman, pp. 116-120.
130 Bohlen, pp. 265-266.
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announce his decision
early December, and he planned to
publicly before Truman's State of the Union Message
scheduled for January 5 131 .
A major strategy recommendation to be followed until the
elections was presented to Truman in November, 1947 by Clark
Clifford, who succeeded Samuel Rosenman as special counsel
to the President in June, 1946, and who was considered by
many the "top advisor to the Truman administration". The
underlying suggestion of Clifford's memorandum was that the
alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives,
and big city labor should be strengthened in order to be
successful at the 1948 elections. Clifford predicted that
the GOP candidate would be Thomas Dewey, and Henry Wallace
would run as a third party candidate with the support of the
Communists. Clifford was strongly anti
- Communist and since
1946 he had analyzed Soviet
-American relations, which helped
shape the containment policy. He feared Wallace would take
away enough votes from the Democrats to permit a Republican
victory. He believed that poor relations with the Russians
would intensify, but during crises the American people
usually supports the President. An attack against Wallace
should be launched "whenever the moment is psychologically
correct" by pointing out his Communist connections, but some
channels must be left unblocked if he wanted to return to
the Democrats. Truman's role as commander- in- chief and
131 Yarnell, pp. 26-27.
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coordinator of the foreign policy should be emphasized,
since recently it had been Marshall who had moved into the
foreground, but the voters in 1948 would decide about
Truman, not Marshall 132
.
Shortly after Wallace's announcement on December 29
,
1947
about his candidacy on the Progressive party's ticket,
attack against him intensified. Senator Howard McGrath,
chairman of the Democratic National Committee claimed "that
a vote for Wallace ... is vote for the things for which
Stalin, Molotov, and Vishinsky stand". However, the
Progressives seemed to be gaining strength. In February they
won a Congressional seat in a special election to fill in a
vacancy, after which Senator Taylor announced he would run
with Wallace as a Vice Presidential candidate 133
.
It was time for Truman, who had been reserved so far, to
join the anti-Wallace choir. Meanwhile he took up action to
step on the offensive in the legislative area, as well. In
his State of the Union Message on January 7
,
1948 he
outlined a broad scope of actions about promoting human
rights, development of human and conservation of natural
resources, and raising the standard of living. Concerning
foreign policy issues the President expressed his continued
support for the United Nations and the economic
reconstruction of Europe. He insisted that he was "fighting
132 Yarnell, pp. 28-46.
133 Yarnell, pp. 50-54.
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poverty, hunger and suf fering
... striving to achieve a
concord among the peoples
... (and) this leads to peace - not
war”, directly rejecting Wallace's charges. On February 2 he
sent his civil rights message to the Congress to win over
the black vote, in which the impact of the Wallace-
phenomenon was prominent 134
.
As far as the Marshall plan was concerned, in December
Vandenberg was still worried about the prospects of the
large-scale aid program. As he wrote to his wife, "our
friend Marshall is going to have a helluva time down here
when he gets to his long-range plan". Senator Taft was in
favor of a program of less extensive scope, but he compared
Marshall's proposition to the Soviet five-year plans.
Instead of the requested $6.6 billion for the first fifteen
months Taft cited former President Hoover's opinion that $4
billion was sufficient. However, after the coup in
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 had convinced twenty to
thirty hesitating Republicans, this amendment was turned
down in the Senate. During the House Foreign Affairs
Committee hearing the question of an aid to China reappeared
and received an endorsement from former Ambassador to Moscow
William Bullitt, former commander in the Far East General
Wedemeyer, and General MacArthur. Despite Marshall's
134 Truman (vol
. 2), pp. 211-214.
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objections more than $400 million was appropriated for China
within the European Recovery Program135
.
On March 17, in a special address to the Congress and
later that day in his St. Patrick's Day speech, Truman for
the first time accused the Soviet Union of threatening
peace. He openly identified Wallace with the Communists,
after the former secretary blamed the Czechoslovakian coup
on the administration. According to Wallace, it was a
natural reaction for the Soviet Union to consolidate its
positions after a series of aggressive steps taken by
Truman 136
.
In his St. Patrick's Day speech the President touched
upon the signing of the Brussels Pact that happened on the
same day, and gave it a very warm welcome, but he also
perceived that the Brussels Pact was not enough and tried to
get bi-partisan support for joining a peacetime military
^-lli^-tice • On April 27 Marshall, Under Secretary of State
Robert Lovett, Vandenberg, and Dulles met at Blair House and
agreed that a regional pact was needed and the Congress
should pass a resolution in favor of it. According to
Secretary Forrestal "the tactics would be to have this
action initiated by the Republicans and to have the ball
picked up immediately by the President". Lovett and
135 Hartman, pp. 159-165.
136 Hartman, pp. 168-169.
137 Truman (vol. 2), pp. 278-279.
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Vandenberg drafted a resolution which was passed shortly by
the Senate on June 11, and only three weeks later the
administration began discussions with European countries
about a military alliance 138
.
Meanwhile, further "cooling" of the Cold War, the Berlin
Blockade, the success of the Marshall Plan and the
Vandenberg resolution severely undermined Wallace's approach
to foreign policy, which was the core of his program. He
made a final attempt in early May to save his situation by
writing a letter to Stalin, but in the fall campaign the
Progressives no longer posed a substantial threat to the
Democrats 139
.
In the final stage of the 1948 campaign the GOP adopted
the Vandenberg foreign policy plank that charged the
administration with lack of clarity and consistency. The
Democrats were criticized for the Yalta and Potsdam
agreements, because they allowed the Russians to control the
Kuriles, North Korea, and Manchuria, endangering Alaska and
the West Coast, and enabled them to cut Europe into two
creating instability and dictatorship. Despite these charges
foreign policy did not become a decisive issue in the
campaign 140 .
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CHAPTER 3
ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1948
As has been pointed out in the introductory chapter, the
two most helpful methods to examine the impact of internal
factors on foreign policy are to analyze regime
vulnerability and fragmentation.
Totalitarian regimes tend to be stable, especially if a
certain period of time has passed since their establishment.
Oppresssive regimes may gain power by either overthrowing a
democratic government, or as a continuation of an
undemocratic pattern of rule in a particular country. In the
latter case, the regime may consolidate its power more
rapidly than in the former. However, in both instances the
totalitarian leadership is highly vulnerable in its first
years of operation.
The communist government of the Soviet Union could not be
considered an unexperienced regime in 1945. It had been
ruling the country for more than twenty- five years, and most
of its top leaders had been in position since the 1920s. The
population had time to adapt to the expectations of the
communists. Stalin had finished the great purges and had
removed practically every element from every stratum of
society and the bureaucracy that had represented a potential
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threat to his power. This required approximately 50 million
lives, but the regime was finally safe.
There had been no change in the top leadership since the
mid- twenties
. No position in the government or the
bureaucracy at any level was subject to competition. There
were no political parties, there was basically no political
life. The lack of constitutional and legal procedures gave
ground to abuses of power without consequences
.
Accountability was not a factor in Soviet politics. Public
officials and the public were separated, with no
communication between them. There was no free press or radio
that could have revealed the real face of the system.
Journalists were members of the regime with political
functions to ensure that only one policy line was present in
the public mind. If a grain of sand should still have gotten
into the machinery, there was one of the most fearful secret
polices in history at the Party's disposal.
In short, the Soviet regime was not exposed to a high
number of vulnerability factors. The only ones that were
present emerged from the effects of the war. As we have
discussed, a serious disintegrating process started in the
party and the society. The grip had to be eased, and it was
difficult to reinstitute it. The mere fact that the
dictatorship of the proletariat allied with the most hateful
imperialist states shook the ideological basis of the power
of the Party. There was a considerable expectation in the
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pre-war
society that Stalin would not return to the
routines. As a matter of course, the very nature of the
communist system did not allow the continuation of a freer
atmoshphere
.
In general, democratic regimes are more vulnerable than
totalitarian ones. The political group that controls the
government has to compete for power with other political
formations in regular elections. They are bound to be
replaced if their power bases shrink or if their opponents
gain more influence than they possess. There is a change at
the top if the ruling group violates the written and
unwritten rules of the political game. Furthermore, politics
takes place under the continuous attention of the public.
The population or the electorate judges the leadership
either directly on the way political decisions affect their
lives, or indirectly through the picture the free media
projects about it.
Being a democratic country, these remarks apply to the
United States, as well. The period this thesis treats was
especially one when the party of government could not feel
its power entirely secure. The Democrats had been in the
White House and holding a majority in the Congress for more
than a decade. Although they were unable to grab the
presidency before another seven years, the Republicans were
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clearly getting more popular, and in fact they gained a
majority in the Congress in 1946.
Additionally, in 1945 the Democrats lost one of their
greatest assets, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a leader who had
been elected president an unprecedented four times. The new
president was far less charismatic than his predecessor and,
most importantly, was not identified closely with the New
Deal, the political magic word that meant an almost
automatic election victory for whoever put it on its flag in
the 1940s.
Furthermore, the country had just been through a costly
and exhausting world war, and although its domestic economic
effects were clearly more positive than negative, it
required an enormous effort of demobilization and
reorganization
.
Finally, there is probably no other country where the
mass media has greater influence than in America. The press
and the radio stations already in the 1940s were hungry for
every piece of information. The public and private life of
the most low- ranked politician took place in front of the
entire country, and no one of them could afford to make
mistakes
.
On the basis of the preceding observations, we may claim
that there were several vulnerability factors the governing
regime in the United States had to take into account.
However, the overall American political system, the liberal
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democracy based on representation and freedom was not
vulnerable. Among the major political groups competing for
power there was not a single one that aimed to overthrow the
prevailing order. Democratic institutions, market economy,
and free enterprise were among the most cherished values
that no significant party dared to question. The replacement
of governments might take place every four years, but the
entire process followed time honored constitutional
regulations and affected only the top political positions.
Additionally, the institutions of the state were legitimate.
As far as vulnerability is concerned, to conclude the
above discussion, the regime in the United States was
exposed to several factors that diminished its safety, but
the ultimate political order was stable.
The other crucial point of view to be analyzed in order
to understand the relationship of internal conditions and
foreign policy is regime fragmentation. As we elaborated on
it earlier, the concept denotes the existence of competing
individuals, institutions, and parties within a regime, each
of which demands a share in the decisionmaking process.
Furthermore, a single leader's ability to control the
political sphere is also a significant element of regime
fragmentation
.
Any discussion of personalities in the Soviet Union
between the 1920s and 1950s must center around Yosif Stalin.
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Opinions vary concerning the extent Stalin could have his
own way in the leadership. The picture is more subtle than
it is generally presented. On the one hand, Stalin was an
unquestioned master. Series of legends and an entire cult of
personality were constructed around him. He was respected
and feared above any power. Political conspiracies in the
background generally were not plotted vertically against
him, but horizontally among the secondary factions who
competed for his grace. On the other hand, he was aging and
more and more exhausted. He was no longer able to devote
equal and scrupulous attention to each segment of the
country as he had been before the war. His illness attacked
him periodically, and then he was compelled to withdraw from
his duties completely for weeks.
As far as rank and renown were concerned, Stalin was
followed by the longest serving Politburo members. Molotov,
Andreyev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan had been on that body
since the twenties, and Stalin had practically no means to
eliminate them. However, he probably did not even have to
concern himself about them. Despite their eminence they did
not participate actively in the power struggles.
According to the main argument of the thesis, the third
line in the leadership consisting of Zhdanov, Malenkov,
Beriya, and Voznesenskii
,
was the most dynamic, the most
dangerous from Stalin's point of view, and the most
effective in influencing key decisions. We have argued that
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Zhdanov patronized forces of relative moderation during
1945-1946. During this period he adopted a fairly relaxed
view on world affairs. As it can be inferred from his public
speeches and policies, he saw no danger of a new war and
considered the division within the Grand Alliance to be
horizontal, not vertical, that is not between blocs of
states, but between certain elements within the states which
favored conflict. Voznesenskii appeared also relatively
moderate in 1946, calling for establishing balance between
heavy industry and consumer production. However, by the
summer of 1947, as the Cold War tensions were rising high,
and because their position in the Party started to
deteriorate, this foreign policy stance proved no longer
viable, and they adopted a tougher approach. At the
Cominform meeting in September, 1947 and in the campaign on
the economic front initiated against the views of Yevgenii
Varga, Zhdanov and Voznesenskii were the central characters.
The profile of the Cominform that was given to it after the
Malenkov group had gained the upper hand in the struggle
showed that Zhdanov still advocated the possibility of
various ways towards communism. Malenkov and Beriya already
in 1946 placed emphasis on international dangers and called
for establishing a stronger defense 141 .
It was not necessary for all personalities in the
Politburo to rally behind one of the groupings. Bulganin,
141 Hahn, McCagg, etc.
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Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov remained uncommitted to
either side, though in particular issues they had to join
one of them to achieve their goals. After the causes had
been accomplished, they always withdrew to the middle.
Bulganin participated in Stalin's assault on the army when
he became a political deputy minister of the Armed Services.
Khrushchev was called back to Moscow in 1949 to
counterweight the dominance of the revived Malenkov
group 142
; Mikoyan, as Commissar of Foreign Trade, was the
chairman of the committee that investigated the dismantling
of the German industries 143
. Molotov praised the efforts of
the Leningrad leadership during the war and was one of the
main figures of the party revival. He and Zhdanov were the
father figures of the Nazi - Bolshevik pact, but whereas
Zhdanov was made the scapegoat, Molotov's diplomatic skills
were useful for Stalin. He put distance between himself and
Zhdanov and joined Malenkov and Beriya to suggest to Stalin
that he send Zhdanov to Leningrad. In 1945-1947 he
maneuvered back to Zhdanov, but without irreversible
commitments, although in 1949 during the Leningrad affair he
was removed from the top of the Foreign Ministry 144 .
Stalin himself during 1945 and 1946 supported the more
moderate approach. After realizing that Zhdanov's
142 Ra'anan, pp. 13-15.
143 Conquest (1968), pp. 645-649.
144 Ra'anan, p. 17.
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predominance in the apparatus and his alliance with Tito had
become more than dangerous for him he started to back
Malenkov and the fast homogenization of Eastern Europe,
simultaneously maintaining his friendliness toward the West
throughout 1947 and 1948.
Taking a look at the personalities in the immediate
postwar American political life, we find a president in the
center who did not gain the office through election. He was
not new to politics having served as a public official for
years at the local level and two terms as a United States
Senator. Nevertheless, most of his close advisors had uneasy
feelings as to whether he would be able to handle foreign
affairs effectively. It need be noted that Truman was not
entirely inexperienced in that area, either: he was chairman
of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense.
As to the formation of his beliefs, Harry Truman took an
early interest in history, participated in World War I in
Europe, and his formative years from a political point of
view coincided with the failure of the League of Nations and
the aggressions committed by the Central Powers in the early
thirties. He was a strong supporter of FDR and the New Deal,
but he was coming from an entirely different background, a
Missouri middle class family.
The president had always been strongly anti - communist
,
as
had been most of his top colleagues. We may group the major
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politicians into three categories, as far as their attitudes
toward foreign policy were concerned. In the first group we
can place those who ever made pronouncements that could be
interpreted as shows of a compromising stance in relation to
the Soviet Union.
We have cited remarks of Secretary Stimson, General
Marshall (pp. 58-59)
,
General Eisenhower (p. 61) . Their
opinions, however, were prompted by a concern about the war
effort, or were pronounced shortly after the war when
cooperation between America and the Soviet Union had taken
place. Another stance, voiced by Secretary Ickes (p. 61)
,
was typical of those who were either not experts on foreign
issues, or had served in the government during the
Depression when as a matter of course those countries the
governments of which allegedly had assumed a greater
responsibility for the social welfare of their citizens had
been looked upon with sympathy. A third pattern of attitude,
similar to that represented by Joseph Davies and Harry
Hopkins (pp. 61-62), characterized diplomats during the war
who had been elevated by FDR as part of his strategy of
suppressing experts on Russia who might have jeopardized the
operation of the Grand Alliance.
A very important factor that was clearly friendly towards
the Soviet Union was the American public. President
Roosevelt's efforts after the US entered the war to push the
real face of communism to the background were very
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successful. Russia was not perceived as a country that was
just as dangerous as Nazi Germany, and the public was
certainly not ready to substitute Uncle Joe for Hitler, at
least not before the end of 1946. But, as always, public
opinion shifted back to its original position after the
media image of the Soviet Union changed.
The only notable political character who was a leftist-
isolationist and an apologist of communism was Henry Wallace
accompanied by his Progressive followers inside and outside
the Congress. According to Truman, Wallace was the best
Secretary of Agriculture the United States had ever had.
However, his performance at the end of his career diverted
the attention of the contemporary and subsequent generations
from his great past accomplishments. The former vice
president did not start out as a communist sympathizer. He
was a Cabinet member of the most powerful capitalist
country, responsible for important economic policies. We
have sufficient grounds to assume that his foreign policy
position throughout 1946 and at the beginning of 1947 was
based on a genuine concern about the increasingly unstable
world order, and he was occupied with a quest for resolving
the problem of atomic weapons.
As opposed to this, as he became more and more active
asserting his ideas both in the domestic and the
international arena, he could no longer maintain an
unaffiliated position towards those whose cause he was
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defending. He found himself entirely isolated in the
Democratic Party, and as a matter of course was placed both
by himself and by the public to the left edge of the
political stage. He could not avoid an actual involvement
with communists. As we have referred to it earlier, his
political opponents did not fail to point out his links with
the communists during the 1948 presidential campaign.
We may claim that all the other significant personalities
who were in positions where they could affect foreign policy
decisions (Acheson, Bohlen, Byrnes, Clifford, Harriman,
Kennan, Vandenberg, Taft, Dulles, Eaton, Churchill), were
consistently anti
- communist and opposed any appeasement of
the Soviets during the period under discussion here.
Of these we need to emphasize the influence of Averell
Harriman and Winston Churchill. The ambassador from the
beginning insisted on a firm stance toward the Russians. He
was the American politician who established the closest
contact with Stalin and who was allowed to see the
Generalissimo on a regular basis. It was characteristic of
his prominence that the president selected him as the new
Secretary of Commerce after the firing of Henry Wallace.
If there was anyone who favored a tougher approach in
relation to the Soviet Union than Harriman, it was the
British Prime Minister. Although both Roosevelt and Truman
held Churchill in high esteem, they had reservations about
Britain as a colonial empire and Churchill as an old
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fashioned conservative leader. Truman was disturbed by
Churchill's demands to retain the territories occupied by
American and British troops at the end of the war, and to
hold the Potsdam Conference early; nevertheless he did not
yield to the Soviets in San Francisco and Potsdam, partly at
Churchill's influence.
There were two major incidents between 1945 and 1948 that
took place between leading personalities over foreign policy
issues. The first one started in October 1945 at the London
Foreign Ministers' Conference and culminated after the
Moscow meeting in December, but it had its roots back in the
1944 presidential elections. As we have analyzed it earlier,
Byrnes blamed Truman for not getting the vice presidency.
This episode made him assume after being appointed Secretary
of State that he was entitled to an independent position in
the Cabinet, and started to engage in adventurous
negotiations at the above two conferences. Truman was
furious because of not having been consulted, because he did
not agree with the deals Byrnes had made and, ultimately,
because he felt the Secretary did not accept his supremacy
in decision making. In this manner it is clear that Byrnes's
attempts were motivated by his intention to assert himself
as an equal authority in foreign affairs rather than by a
special inclination to appease the Russians.
The Wallace episode did not involve personal conflicts.
Unlike the Byrnes affair, it was based on serious policy
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differences that could not be resolved by a simple
replacement. After Wallace left the Cabinet, Truman no
longer had any control over him. Wallace took advantage of
his image as a prominent New Dealer and former vice
president relying on the residual public sympathy towards
the Soviet Union and the growing concern about the unstable
world order. Being highly unpopular and lacking extensive
public opinion data, Truman had to take Wallace very
seriously, especially after the former secretary announced
his bid for the presidency. It was necessary for Truman to
re-establish himself as the protector of the common man,
otherwise the non-Republican vote would have been more
evenly split between the Democrats and the Progressives,
resulting in an automatic Republican victory, as it was
prognosticated by the Elsey and Clifford memos noted
earlier. The president as part of a large-scale strategy
vetoed the Taft -Hartley bill and prepared his radical civil
rights proposal to counterbalance the Progressive influence.
In foreign policy, the main area of their competition, a
clear example of Wallace's presence was Truman's attempt to
find accommodation with the Soviets through a direct, secret
negotiation, but the idea was dropped when Marshall
threatened to quit after he had been informed about the
planned mission of Chief Justice Fred Vinson to Stalin 145
.
145 Ferrell, pp. 250-257.
109
The second factor that determines the degree of regime
fragmentation is the presence of different institutions
which strive to assert their power in the face of or beside
the others
.
In the Soviet Union, as in most totalitarian countries,
there was no separation of power. Theoretically, there
existed a legislative body, an executive, and courts, but in
practice there was only one power center that had a say in
politics. The Party was an all-encompassing organization
that controlled every sphere of the society. Both at the
national and the local levels, decisions were made by the
Party leaders and were given out as commands to the
different institutions. Officials like government members or
city council chairpersons functioned as mere tools in the
hands of the Party. They had no right to initiate policies;
the plans described by the Party had to be carried out
without questioning.
As we have pointed out however, in addition to the
totalitarian pattern of policymaking there were other
aspects at work, as well. Although Party orders were
expected to be implemented servilely, the leaders were aware
how important the efficient operation of the bureaucracy
was. Keeping the largest country in the world under total
control required an immense and at least to some extent
organized army of officials. For this reason, there was an
unspoken but unambiguous trade-off between the Party and the
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bureaucracy that insured that the interests of both sides
were represented in policy.
Furthermore, as chains of personal subordinances similar
to feudal hierarchies evolved, decisions came about as
results of compromises between the individual members of
these chains. On the one hand, in order for officials to get
opportunities for promotion, they needed to identify
themselves with the positions of their superiors. On the
other hand, leaders were compelled to please their
subordinates to build up power bases that enabled them to
assert themselves in the face of other factions.
The other factors that participated in the largely
informal Soviet policy making process were also
characteristic of totalitarian regimes. First, it was the
enormous military establishment that ultimately made the
Soviet Union a superpower. Compared to other sectors of the
country, it was relatively developed, although its main
strength was given to it by the gigantic standing army. In
budgetary and other key political decision the interests of
the army always represented top priority. Second, a
repressive society is unthinkable without a mighty secret
police. The NKVD, later MVD or KGB, stood entirely above the
law, and in some instances even over the Party. Its power
permeated frontiers, and helped keep the orbit countries
obedient. Third, the Soviet Union was one of the most
industrialized countries in the world. The smooth
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maintenance of the military required a full-speed industrial
production. For this reason, heavy industry always took
precedence over the other sectors of the economy.
On the basis of the above observations we may claim that
the Soviet regime was fragmented to a small degree in the
absence of competing political parties. The fragmentation
that existed originated from the rival interest groups and
institutions, but their influence was always subordinated to
the ultimate supremacy of the Party, which maintained a
public posture of agreement.
In the United States there are two basic institutions
that share responsibility for making and implementing
decisions: the president and the Congress. Originating from
the division of power which is the ultimate characteristic
of democracies, political decisions are made by the
executive and the legislative branch in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution which is supervised by the
Supreme Court. Since in the United States the president is
the prime diplomat and the chief negotiator, American
foreign policy is fundamentally formulated by the executive
branch. However, resulting from the treaty approving,
budgetary, and war declaring responsibilities of the
Congress, successful foreign policy cannot be pursued
without cooperation with the legislative body 146 .
146 McCormick, pp . 265-344.
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The first four postwar years of politics in the United
States can clearly be divided into two periods. Concerning
foreign developments the years 1945 and 1946 passed in the
belief that the successful establishment of the United
Nations would eventually create the possibility for
cooperation among the great powers and a stable, democratic
world order would be achieved. However, by the end of 1946,
because of the Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and the
futility and atmosphere of the negotiations, President
Truman was impelled to institute a bottom-up change in the
basic American foreign policy tactics. Throughout 1947 and
1948, gaining the support of the Congress, his
administration laid the groundwork for an unparalleled break
with the isolationist warnings of President Washington, that
reached its climax on April 4, 1949, when the United States,
for the first time in its history, became the member of a
peacetime entangling military alliance.
The division of Truman's first term into two parts can be
applied to domestic politics, as well, and the applicability
is not accidental . Because in the Seventy Ninth Congress the
Democratic Party enjoyed a majority, and significant foreign
policy decisions requiring Congressional authorization were
not made, the legislative branch did not play a central role
in foreign policy during 1945 and 1946. These two years were
taken up by the long and generally fruitless attempts to
save the East -West cooperation, and formulate a novel
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approach to the changed world within the administration.
Similarly to the leading Soviet politicians who basically
saw no possibility for an unaltered Soviet
-American
alliance, the overwhelming majority of President Truman's
advisors opposed the continuation of Roosevelt's wartime
appeasing tactics. The year 1947 brought not only the
embodiment of the previous years' speculations, but also the
Eightieth Congress with a strong Republican majority. These
two simultaneous changes elevated the Congress to occupy a
more influential stance on foreign policy. This was also the
period when the tacit alliance of Southern Democrats and
conservative Republicans became tangible for the first time.
This situation was not to favor an effective foreign
plicy formation. The program of the GOP laid little emphasis
on foreign issues. The Republicans were strongly anti-
communist and internationalist, but unwilling to devote the
taxpayers' money to ventures abroad. To press the major
lagislation in the foreign policy area through Congress the
president was compelled to exaggerate the communist threat.
Those proposals that lacked the vehement anti- communist
potential got often stuck in the House.
However, the attitude of the Congress was not always
totally uncompromising. The leader of congressional
Republicans, Robert Taft conceded the number one position on
foreign issues to Senator Arthur Vandenberg in exchange for
the latter's support in the domestic field. The majority of
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the Republican representatives rallied behind the
bipartisanship of Vandenberg and Congressman Eaton, and
Congress in close cooperation with the President created the
foundations of the American foreign policy that was followed
throughout the Cold War.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
As a final conclusion we may claim that internal
conditions did constrain foreign policy both in the Soviet
Union and the United States. Our case studies have provided
examples for the interrelation of these spheres and
demonstrated the differences prevalent in totalitarian and
democratic regimes in this respect.
The totalitarian Soviet regime was relatively stable, the
top leadership had been in power practically for a quarter
of a century, and thanks to the great purges of the thirties
"reactionary" elements had been removed from the society.
Accountability was not a factor in Soviet politics and the
secret police served as a safety valve in case the previous
components broke down.
Regime fragmentation was low; the power of Yosif Stalin
was one of the most pervasive in history. A strict hierarchy
and long- serving "sacred cows" ensured that the state of
a-ffairs was not shaken up from below. Furthermore, the
relatively effective operation of an immense bureaucracy and
the absence of the separation of power and political
competition further decreased fragmentation.
Factors that increased vulnerability and added to regime
fragmentation were few in the Soviet Union in the late
forties. The most important ones were the effects of the war
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that were possibly the most devastating exactly in this
country. Despite the relatively monolithic character of the
communist leadership, several patterns of policymaking
existed that involved not only the tyrannic commands of
Stalin but also trade-offs within the bureaucracy and in and
around the Politburo. Fragmentation from an institutional
point of view emerged from the general lack of legitimacy in
the political sphere and the existence of rival power groups
with parochial interests, although the influence of these
was always subordinated to the supremacy of the Party.
In the United States internal conditions and foreign
policy were more closely intertwined. In our discussion we
have sorted out a number of regime vulnerability and
fragmentation factors. Individual regimes were relatively
vulnerable politically. They were compelled to compete for
power periodically with other participants of politics and
could be removed from power if circumstances changed. As a
result of the continuous media attention the information
flow between the government and the governed was two-
directional. In the immediate postwar years the party of
government was losing power and was divided internally
largely as a result of the death of its long-time leader.
The war not only made America the number one power in the
world but also caused several serious difficulties that were
almost as hard to tackle as the war itself.
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The character of the American political life and the
nature of the hierarchy made the relationship of leading
personalities to each other and to the affairs of the
country different from that in the Soviet Union. Issues and
decisions were discussed publicly, and a greater number of
individuals and institutions could affect their outcomes.
Political debates were normal phenomena and could involve
problems of cardinal significance.
These circumstances, however, did not render American
foreign policy arbitrary or impossible to calculate.
Individual regimes were vulnerable but constitutional
democracy was not. There were a great number of participants
that filtered foreign policy decisions but the general
legitimacy made these decisions authentic and orderly.
We have seen that there were more vulnerability factors
in the United States and the American political regime was
more fragmented than the Soviet one in the late nineteen-
forties
. According to our previous premises this means that
American foreign policy was more constrained by internal
factors than Soviet foreign policy. This claim, supposedly,
has a dual consequence. It is more difficult to unfold the
real motives behind Soviet foreign policy behavior and to
infer from foreign policy decisions to domestic developments
and vice versa, whereas students of the two spheres of
American politics can mutually contribute to and draw from
each other's research.
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